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Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Co-
Appellant UNUM Life Insurance Company of America hereby submits the following 
Brief of Co-Appellant. 
LIST OF PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
caption of the case contains the names of all parties to the proceeding in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Utah from which the Order of Certification was 
issued. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter arises from an Order of Certification issued by the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Utah pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2 (2001), to answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following questions of state law have been certified by the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Utah1: 
1. In a first party insurance situation, may an insured recover 
consequential damages, other than attorney's fees, for breach of the express terms 
of an insurance contract? If so, what are the consequential damages that are 
recoverable for breach of the express terms of an insurance contract and how are 
they distinguished from the consequential damages for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that are recoverable under Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). 
A copy of the Order of Certification is included in the Addendum at Tab "A". 
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2. Did Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301, entitled "Timely Payment of 
Claims," allow a private cause of action by the insured against his or her insurer 
for violation of the statute in 2000? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, both 
certified questions are questions of law "for original disposition" by this Court. 
Grundberg v. The Upjohn Co., 813 P. 2d 89, 90 (Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW 
Pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, any court 
of the United States may invoke Rule 41 by entering an order of certification as 
described in the rule. When invoking the rule, the certifying court may act either 
sua sponte or upon a motion by any party. In the U.S. District Court, both the 
plaintiff and defendant orally moved the court to certify the first question presented 
above, and the plaintiff orally moved the court to certify the second question. 
Hearing Transcript, July 29,2003, at pp. 13-19,28-29,48-49. 
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STATUTES 
With respect to the second question presented, Utah Code Ann. §31A-26-
301 (2000)2 reads: 
Timely payment of claims. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall 
timely pay every valid insurance claim made by an insured. 
By rule the commissioner may prescribe the kinds of notice 
and proof of loss that will establish validity, the manner in 
which an insurer may make a bona fide denial of a claim, the 
periods of time within which payment is required to be made 
to be timely, and the reasonable interest rates to be charged 
upon late claim payments. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the payment of a claim 
is not overdue during any period in which the insurer is 
unable to pay the claim because there is no recipient legally 
able to give a valid release for the payment, or in which the 
insurer is unable to determine who is entitled to receive the 
payment, provided that the insurer has promptly notified the 
claimant of the inability and has offered in good faith to pay 
the claim promptly when the inability is removed. 
(3) This section applies only to claims made by claimants 
in direct privity of contract with the insurer. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit was filed in the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County and was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah on 
diversity grounds. The plaintiff, Gary Machan ("Machan"), averred that the 
defendant, UNUM Life Insurance Company of America ("UNUM"), owed him 
A copy of each insurance statute referred to in this brief is included in the Addendum 
at Tab "B". 
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benefits under two disability income insurance policies. Machan averred that 
UNUM had failed to pay him his disability benefits after he underwent open heart 
surgery in March 1999. UNUM countered that Machan's physicians had certified 
that he was fit to return to work following a three month recuperation period and 
that UNUM had paid all of the disability benefits that were owed under the 
disability policies. Machan further averred that UNUM had failed to pay him 
disability benefits for a mental/psychiatric claim that Machan filed in 2000. 
UNUM countered that Machan's disability could not be determined based on the 
information provided by Machan's treating health care providers and that Machan 
filed suit and withdrew his consent to release of medical information before 
UNUM could complete its claims determination. 
Machan raised numerous claims for relief including breach of the express 
terms of his insurance contracts with respect to both his cardiac and psychiatric 
claims, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with 
respect to his psychiatric claim. He also averred that UNUM violated the Utah 
Insurance Code, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301 (2000), which requires an 
insurance company to pay all claims in a timely manner. 
UNUM filed a motion for summary judgment addressing each of Machan's 
claims for relief. With respect to Machan's claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, UNUM urged that Machan's claim was 
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fairly debatable according to Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 56 P. 3d 524, 
533 (Utah 2002). UNUM supported its motion with the testimony of its outside 
consulting psychiatrist who testified that the information provided by Machan's 
treating psychiatrist and psychologist was contradictory and that many of the 
medical records were illegible. UNUM's consulting psychiatrist had attempted on 
at least five separate occasions to engage in what are referred to in the insurance 
industry as "doc to doc calls" with Machan's health care providers, but before he 
was able to speak with Machan's psychiatrist or psychologist, Machan filed suit 
and withdrew his release of any further information and made it impossible for 
UNUM to gather needed information other than through the formal discovery 
process. During discovery UNUM asked Machan to submit to an examination by a 
neuropsychologist, who, even after an MRI of Machan's brain, was still unable to 
determine whether or not Machan was able to perform the material and substantial 
duties of his occupation, which is the contractually agreed upon threshold for 
payment of disability benefits under Machan's disability policies. Nevertheless, 
after being afforded the opportunity to evaluate Machan's MRI, UNUM began 
paying Machan disability benefits retroactively beginning in September 2002. 
At the summary judgment hearing the court asked for additional briefing on 
whether Machan's expert witnesses created an issue of fact on the bad faith claim. 
UNUM addressed the court's concerns by filing two separate motions in limine 
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which have gone unopposed. In the meantime, the trial court, for administrative 
purposes, has denied UNUM's Motion for Summary Judgment, without prejudice, 
pending the resolution of the questions raised by this certification. 
Machan asserted that, in addition to his attorney's fees, he suffered 
consequential damages from the following losses: (1) worsening of his 
psychological condition; (2) inability to afford psychological treatment for himself 
and his mentally ill son; (3) depletion of his assets and savings in order to meet 
basic living expenses; and (4) the inability to have any significant gainful 
employment due to his worsened psychological condition. 
Machan asserts that he can recover for these consequential losses for a 
breach of either the express terms of his policies, or for a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
The issues that bring us to the Utah Supreme Court are whether there are any 
consequential damages, other than attorney's fees, that may be recoverable for 
breach of the express terms of an insurance contract, and whether the Utah 
Insurance Code, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301, provided a private cause of action 
in 2000. 
In this brief UNUM extends the first issue and also argues that Billings v. 
Union Bankers Insurance Company, 918 P. 2d 461 (Utah 1996)3, should be 
3
 A copy of Billings is included in the Addendum at Tab "C". 
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overruled in part, and that attorney's fees should not be recoverable in a first party 
insurance situation unless the insured proves that the insurance company acted in 
bad faith. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Although ordinarily damages recoverable for breach of contract include 
general and consequential damages, it is clear that the case law treats insurance 
contracts differently than other contracts. Prior to Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985)4, the only damages that could be recovered 
by an insured for breach of an insurance contract in a first-party context, including 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, was the predictable 
fixed dollar amount of coverage provided by the policy. Beck changed the law to 
provide an insured with a remedy for its insurer's bad faith conduct, and to provide 
an incentive to insurance companies not to act unreasonably and in bad faith. To 
provide this incentive, Beck permits the recovery of consequential losses arising 
from a breach of the implied good faith covenant, including attorney's fees, the 
loss of a home or business, bankruptcy, and in unusual cases, mental anguish. 
In a subsequent insurance case, Billings v. Union Bankers Insurance 
Company, supra, the Utah Supreme Court once again treated insurance contracts 
4
 A copy of Beck is included in the Addendum at Tab "D". 
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differently than other contracts and allowed an award of attorney's fees for breach 
of the express terms of an insurance contract in a first-party context, even when the 
insurance contract failed to provide for an award of attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party. By its language, Billings confirmed that the purpose of the broad 
range of consequential damages available under Beck is to provide insurance 
companies with an incentive to act reasonably and in good faith, and that the 
incentive will be lost if consequential damages can be recovered by an insured for 
an insurer's breach of the express contract terms. Accordingly, Billings implies 
that no consequential damages can be recovered for a breach of the express terms 
of an insurance contract. For reasons that are not clear, Billings nevertheless 
allows an insured to recover his attorney's fees for breach of the express contract 
terms, even though this limited measure of consequential damages penalizes an 
insurance company that acts reasonably in denying a claim that a court or jury 
subsequently decides must be paid. Although Billings has never been overruled, 
Utah insurance cases subsequent to Billings have failed to award any consequential 
damages in a first party situation, including attorney's fees, unless there has been a 
breach of the implied good faith covenant. 
It would not further Beck's purpose of encouraging insurers to act 
reasonably if consequential damages can be recovered against an insurer who is 
ultimately determined by a court to have incorrectly denied coverage, regardless of 
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how reasonable the denial. Accordingly, consequential damages, including 
attorney's fees, should not be recoverable for breach of the express terms of an 
insurance contract. 
With respect to the second question certified by the U.S. District Court, the 
Utah Insurance Code did not provide a private cause of action in 2000. If it did, 
the statute would say so. It is not for this Court, or any trial court, to imply a 
private cause of action when the statute is silent. This is a matter that should be 
left to the Utah legislature. Furthermore, to permit a private cause of action would 
vitiate the "fairly debatable" defense. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES SHOULD NOT BE RECOVERABLE FOR 
A BREACH OF THE EXPRESS TERMS OF AN INSURANCE CONTRACT 
A. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange Enlarged The Remedy For An 
Insurer's Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair 
Dealing In A First-Party Situation 
In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that when an insurance company fails to bargain or settle a claim with its 
insured in good faith, the insured can recover damages beyond the maximum dollar 
amount of insurance provided by the policy. Until Beck, an insured's damages 
were limited to the policy coverage and the insured had no effective remedy 
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against an insurer that refused to bargain or settle in good faith in a first-party 
situation. Id. 701 P. 2d at 798; see, Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 
25 Utah 2d 311,480 P. 2d 739 (1971); See also, William Kevin Tanner, Bad Faith 
Claims Against Insurers: The State of Utah Law Fifteen Years after Beck v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 15 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 53. Beck confirmed that an 
insurer has an implied duty to bargain or settle in good faith, and that a breach of 
this duty gives rise to a claim in contract, not tort. 
Other states, California among them, had adopted a tort approach in an effort 
to provide insurance companies selling insurance in their states with an incentive 
to honor their duty of good faith. See, Theresa Viani Agee, Note, Breach of an 
Insurer's Good Faith Duty to its Insured: Tort or Contract?, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 
135,137, fh 20. These states, so Beck observed, believed that existing contract 
principles would not allow recovery beyond policy limits, and had instead adopted 
a tort approach that Beck found to be theoretically unsound. 
To provide the stated incentive to insurance companies to act in good faith, 
Beck expanded the remedy available to insureds and held that consequential 
damages, i.e., those reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably 
foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made, can be recovered for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
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Although it rejected the tort approach, Beck observed that the objective of 
these other states was meritorious and that the measure of damages for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith should "not ignore the principle reason for 
[other courts'] adoption of the [otherwise theoretically unsound] tort approach," 
i.e., to remove any incentive for insurers to breach the duty of good faith by 
expanding. Beck at $02. 
Beck recognized that in an action for breach of a duty to bargain in good 
faith, a broad range of recoverable consequential damages is conceivable, 
including damages stemming from bankruptcy, loss of peace of mind, loss of home 
or business, and in unusual cases, mental anguish. Id. Gary Machan claimed these 
very types of consequential losses in the present case, including: (1) worsening of 
his psychological condition; (2) inability to afford psychological treatment for 
himself and his mentally ill son; (3) depletion of his assets and savings in order to 
meet basic living expenses; and (4) the inability to have any significant gainful 
employment due to his worsened psychological condition. Plaintiffs Opposition 
To Motion For Summary Judgment at pp. 11-12, U.S. District Court Docket Entry 
135. 
Beck found a remedy for insureds whose insurance companies refuse to 
bargain or settle claims in good faith by acknowledging that in a first party 
insurance situation, the relationship between the insured and its insurer is purely 
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contractual. Earlier, in Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., supra, the 
Court had denied an insured a tort remedy for its insurance company's bad faith 
and until Beck it appeared that an insured had no effective remedy. Thus, by 
shifting the focus from tort to contract, Beck found a remedy. 
The obvious corollary to Beck's objective to provide an incentive to 
insurance companies to bargain and settle in good faith by penalizing them if they 
do not is that insurance companies should not be penalized for asserting valid 
defenses and denying questionable claims. The duty of good faith is a two way 
street and it would be unfair not to permit an insurer to have a legitimate dispute 
with an insured resolved before having to pay the claim. Subsequent case law 
addressed this precise issue. 
B. Billings v. Union Bankers Insurance Company Confirmed That 
Consequential Damages Are Not Recoverable In The Absence of Bad 
Faith 
In a case eleven years after Beck, the Third District Court gave an improper 
jury instruction suggesting that consequential damages were available to an insured 
if he could convince the jury that his insurance company had breached the express 
terms of his insurance contract. In Billings v. Union Bankers Insurance Company, 
supra, both the insured's claim that his insurance company had breached the 
express covenants of his insurance policy, and his claim that the implied good faith 
covenant had been breached, went to the jury. The insured demanded 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
consequential damages and the district court instructed the jury that if it found that 
Union Bankers had breached the express coverage provision of the policy it could 
award the insured the value of his policy benefits, and if the jury found Union 
Bankers breached either the express coverage provision or the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, the jury could award the insured consequential 
damages for emotional suffering and mental anguish, medical expenses, lost 
income and earning capacity, and the extent to which the insured had been limited 
in pursuing and enjoying the ordinary affairs of life. Billings, 918 P.2d at 464. 
Union Bankers Insurance Company argued on appeal that the consequential 
damages allowed by Beck are available only for breach of the implied good faith 
covenant, not, as the district court had instructed the jury, for breach of the express 
terms of the insurance policy. The Utah Supreme Court agreed: 
"[T]he implied covenant imposes a duty on first-party 
insurers to act in an objectively reasonable manner in handling 
an insured's claim. It would not further Beck's purpose of 
encouraging insurers to act reasonably if we were to impose the 
broad consequential damages allowed in Beck on every insurer 
who is ultimately determined by a court to have incorrectly 
denied coverage, regardless of how reasonable the denial."... 
Mat 466. 
Billings confirmed that Beck had departed from the "restrictive traditional 
contract damages approach" and had allowed consequential damages for breach of 
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an insurance contract beyond the bare contract terms.5 Billings at 466. Billings 
explained that Beck did not intend to allow consequential damages for breach of 
the express terms of an insurance contract; rather, "We recognized that in 
appropriate circumstances, 'consequential damages for breach of contract may 
reach beyond the bare contract terms'" (emphasis added). Id. Obviously, the 
"appropriate circumstance" to which Billings referred is a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Billings recognized that any time a claim is disputed by an insurance 
company there is likely to be a toll on the insured, but the insurance company 
should not be exposed beyond the limits of its coverage when it has not settled a 
fairly debatable claim and has elected to have the dispute resolved before having to 
pay the claim. See, Billings at 467. So, while Beck emphasized that an insurance 
company needs an incentive to act reasonably and in good faith, Billings explained 
that it would be unfair not to permit a careful insurer who has a legitimate dispute 
5
 In a case four years after Billings, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that Beck 
treats insurance contracts differently than other contracts when it said: 
[0]ur Supreme Court in Beck stated that insurance contracts are to be 
treated differently than other contracts for the simple reason that an insured 
frequently faces catastrophic consequences if funds are not available within 
a reasonable period of time to cover an insured loss; damages for losses 
well in excess of the policy limit, such as for home or business, may 
therefore be foreseeable and provable. 
Pugh v. North Am. Warranty Servs., Inc., 1 P. 3d 570, 575 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000). 
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with an insured over a claim to have the dispute resolved before having to pay the 
claim. Billings explained: 
"[I]t would not further Beck's purpose of encouraging 
insurers to act reasonably if we were to impose the broad 
consequential damages allowed in Beck on every insurer 
who is ultimately determined by a court to have incorrectly 
denied coverage, regardless of how reasonable the denial. 
Such an insurer ought to incur no greater damage exposure 
than any other person breaching the express terms of a 
contract. Indeed, it would be unfair not to permit an insurer 
who has a legitimate dispute with an insured over a claim to 
have the dispute resolved before having to pay the claim. 
Exposure to the sweeping measure of damages available for 
breach of the implied covenant would effectively deny any 
careful insurer the option of declining to pay a contested 
claim and awaiting the outcome of the dispute. 
Billings at 466-467. 
Although Billings allowed the plaintiff in that case to recover his attorney's 
fees as consequential damages for breach of the express terms of the insurance 
contract, Billings otherwise made clear that the consequential damages the plaintiff 
was seeking for breach of the implied good faith covenant were not recoverable 
absent a breach of the implied covenant. 
In spite of its restriction on Beck's consequential damages to a breach of the 
implied good faith covenant, the present case with Gary Machan suggests that 
Billings may have raised more questions than it answered, including: (1) When 
Billings uses language like "broad consequential damages" and "the sweeping 
measure of damages available for breach of the implied covenant," what did it 
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mean? Machan says that this language in Billings implies that there may still be 
consequential damages other than those specifically mentioned in Beck that may be 
recoverable in the absence of bad faith, even though his own consequential losses 
appear to be remarkably similar to the bad faith losses enumerated in Beck; (2) 
Why are attorney's fees recoverable as consequential damages for breach of the 
express terms of an insurance policy? This obviously penalizes an insurer who in 
good faith disputes a legitimate claim, and, when the insurance policy lacks an 
attorney's fees provision, this additional remedy affords an insured a greater 
measure of damages for breach of contract than he would otherwise be entitled to 
recover. 
C. Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company Leaves 
No Doubt That Damages Beyond The Fixed Dollar Amount of Coverage 
Are Only Available For Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of Good 
Faith 
Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 65 P.3d 
1134 (Utah 2001), a case involving a third party insurance claim, seems to answer 
one of the questions raised by Billings. Campbell confirmed, although admittedly 
in dicta, that the purpose of allowing consequential damages in first-party bad faith 
actions beyond the predictable fixed dollar amount of coverage provided by the 
policy is to remove any incentive for an insurer to act in bad faith, thus suggesting 
that any damages beyond the policy limits are not recoverable absent a showing of 
bad faith: 
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"Under Utah law, plaintiffs may recover attorney fees if they 
are successful in pursuing a first-party bad faith suit against 
their insurer. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 
461,468 (Utah 1996). Such actions fall within the rule that 
the damages available to plaintiffs "include both general 
damages, i.e., those flowing naturally from the breach, and 
consequential damages, i.e., those reasonably within the 
contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at 
the time the contract was made." Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). The rationale 
behind allowing recovery of both general and 
consequential damages in first-party, bad faith actions is 
"to remove any incentive for insurers to breach the duty 
of good faith by expanding their exposure to damages 
caused by such a breach beyond the predictable fixed 
dollar amount of coverage provided by the policy." 
Billings, 918 P.2d at 466. Consequential damages in 
first-party bad faith actions can be awarded for such 
things as attorney fees, loss of a home or business, 
damages flowing from bankruptcy, and mental anguish, 
provided such damages are foreseeable. Id. at 468; Beck, 
701 P.2d at 802. (bold and underline added). 
Campbell, 65 P. 3d 1134, 1168, f 120. 
Utah law treats insurance contracts differently than other contracts. 
Consequential damages are not available for every breach of an insurance contract. 
By expanding the measure of "damages caused by such a breach [of the implied 
covenant] beyond the predictable fixed dollar amount of coverage provided by the 
policy," Utah law provides an incentive for an insurance company to honor the 
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implied good faith covenant.6 Campbell makes clear that there is not a broad array 
of consequential damages that may be available for breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith, and a more narrow array of consequential damages that may be 
available for breach of the express terms of the insurance policy. 
D. Allowing Attorney's Fees Without Proving Bad Faith Contravenes 
Beck's Objectives 
We have no good answer to the second question implicit in Billings. 
Allowing an insured to recover attorney's fees as consequential damages for 
6
 We are aware of only one reported Utah decision, other than Billings, where an insured 
sought consequential damages above policy limits, other than attorney's fees, without 
specifically alleging bad faith. In Castillo v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 939 P. 2d 1204, 1211 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1997), cert denied 945 P.2d 1118 (1997), the insureds sought consequential 
damages for the lost use of their automobile when their insurer failed to promptly pay 
uninsured motorist coverage. Although the insureds failed the second required prong for 
an award of consequential damages (i.e., damages must be proved with a reasonable 
degree of certainty), the Court of Appeals suggested that consequential damages would 
otherwise have been recoverable. An obligation to promptly and reasonably bargain and 
settle a claim is precisely the duty of good faith that Beck says is inherent in all insurance 
contracts. Thus, it appears that the insurer's breach in Castillo amounted to a breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith, not a breach of the express terms of the insurance 
policy, even though bad faith was apparently not pleaded. 
7
 The supposed genesis for allowing recovery of attorneys fees as consequential 
damages for breach of the express terms of an insurance contract is Canyon Country 
Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). However, the Billings dissent later pointed 
out that it was unclear whether the attorneys fees in Canyon Country were awarded for 
breach of the implied covenant or for breach of the express terms of the insurance 
contract. See, Billings, 918 P.2d at 469 (Howe, J., dissenting). Prior to Billings, the Utah 
Court of Appeals, basing its ruling on Beck, Canyon Country, and Zions First National 
Bank v. National American Title Insurance Co., 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988), ruled in 
Moore v. Energy Mutual Insurance Co., 814 P.2d 1141 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991), that 
attorneys fees were recoverable as consequential damages for breach of the express terms 
of an insurance contract. None of the three cases the Court of Appeals relied on 
supported Moore. Beck, of course, dealt only with a bad faith claim, and in Zions First 
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breach of the express terms of an insurance policy places an unfair hammer over 
the head of an insurer who legitimately disputes a questionable claim. This is 
precisely contrary to Billings' statement that "Such an insurer ought to incur no 
greater damage exposure than any other person breaching the express terms of a 
contract." Without Billings, the insured would not be awarded attorney's fees 
without an attorney's fees provision in the policy. See, Turtle Management, Inc. v. 
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982) (holding attorney's fees 
may be awarded only if authorized by statute or by contract). 
Allowing attorney's fees as consequential damages absent a finding of bad 
faith also removes the "fairly debatable" shield that encourages insurance 
companies to contest unscrupulous claims. The Utah Supreme Court recently 
stated that, "The denial of a claim is reasonable if the insured's claim is fairly 
debatable. Under Utah law, if an insurer denies an 'insured's claim [that] is fairly 
debatable, [then] the insurer is entitled to debate it and cannot be held to have 
breached the implied covenant if it chooses to do so.'" Prince v. Bear River 
Mutual Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 533 (Utah 2002). "If the evidence presented creates 
a factual issue as to the claim's validity, there exists a debatable reason for denial,. 
National Bank the Court of Appeals ruled that attorneys fees would have been 
recoverable had the insured made a bad faith claim, but that attorneys fees were 
specifically not recoverable for straight breach of contract in that case because there was 
no attorney's fees provision in the insurance contract. Zions, 749 P.2d 656. 
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. . eliminating the bad faith claim." Id. at 535 (quoting Callioux v. Progressive Ins. 
Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). The quite obvious purpose of the 
fairly debatable defense is to shield insurance companies from damages in excess 
of policy limits when they challenge questionable claims. Billings does injury to 
this defense. 
Not surprisingly, Billings appears not to have been followed. No Utah state 
court decision subsequent to Billings allows attorney's fees as consequential 
o 
damages for breach of the express terms of an insurance policy. A year after 
Billings, in Gibbs M. Smith, Inc.f v. U.S. Fidelity, 949 P. 2d 337 (Utah 1997), the 
Court, without any mention of Billings, overturned the district court's award of 
attorney's fees for breach of an insurance contract in a first party situation and 
remanded for a determination as to whether the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing had been breached and for an award of attorneys fees accordingly. 
In Pugh v. North American Warranty Services, supra., the Court of Appeals 
affirmed an award of attorney's fees only after concluding that the insured had 
breached not the express policy terms, but the implied good faith covenant. The 
court stated: 
8
 In an unpublished decision, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in dicta relied on Billings 
for the proposition that an insured can recover attorney's fees as consequential damages 
for breach of the express terms of an insurance policy in a first party situation. Johnson 
v. Life Investors Insurance Company of America., 216 F. 3d 1087, 2000 WL 954840 (10 
Cir. 2000). 
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"Of course, to recover attorney's fees for breach of an 
insurance contract, the insured must demonstrate that the 
insurer has breached the implied covenant to act in good 
faith in its performance of the insurance contract. 
Pugh, 1 P.3d at 576. 
Beck's and Billings' stated objective to provide insurance companies with an 
incentive to act in good faith cannot be reconciled with allowing an award of 
attorney's fees for breach of the express terms of the insurance policy. The dissent 
in Billings focused on this obvious inconsistency in logic and we suggest that the 
issue should now be revisited by the Court and this part of Billings should be 
overruled. 
II 
MUJI AGREES WITH UNUM 
Because the Model Uniform Jury Instructions are in the process of being 
revised, we advise the Court of two MUJI instructions that support UNUM's 
position, should the Court desire to provide confirmation or specific guidance to 
the committee charged with drafting new jury instructions. 
MUJI 21.4 Relationship Between Insurer and Insured. 
The relationship between insurer and insured is contractual. 
The insurance policy does not create a relationship of trust 
or reliance between the parties, it simply obligates the 
insurer to pay the covered claims submitted by the insured in 
accordance with the policy. Without more, a breach of the 
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terms of the policy can give rise only to a claim for damages 
under the policy. 
References: 
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) 
MUJI 21.9 General And Consequential Damages. 
If you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
insurer breached its contractual duty of good faith and fair 
dealing to the insured, you may award the insured 
compensatory damages. Damages recoverable for the 
breach of this duty are damages for those injuries or losses 
flowing naturally from the breach, and those losses or 
injuries which were reasonably within the contemplation of, 
or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the 
contract was made. In awarding these damages, you may 
award an amount in excess of the policy limits specified in 
the insurance policy. In determining the amount of damages 
to award, you may consider [the loss of the insured's 
property] [the insured's expenses and debt associated with 
the loss of the property] [the insured's bankruptcy] [the 
insured's loss of financial reputation and credit] [the 
insured's loss of income or profit] [the insured's past and 
future emotional suffering and mental anguish] [any other 
detriment naturally flowing from the insurer's breach]. 
However, only those factors that were reasonably 
foreseeable by the parties and that were proximately caused 
by the insurer's breach may be considered, (italics added) 
References: 
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) 
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Ill 
THE UTAH INSURANCE CODE DID NOT PROVIDE A PRIVATE CAUSE 
OF ACTION IN 2000 
The U.S. District Court has asked whether Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301(l) 
(2000) provided a private right of action in 2000. The answer from this Court 
should be that it did not. 
No Utah decision has ever recognized a private cause of action under Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-26-3 01 (2000) which provides rather plainly that "Unless 
otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall timely pay every valid insurance claim 
made by an insured." 
The insurance code has been put in place as a regulatory scheme that 
governs the insurance industry. See Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-102. Section 31A-
26-301(1) (2000) demonstrates the regulatory nature of the statute: 
"[B]y rule the commissioner may prescribe the kinds of 
notice and proof of loss that will establish validity, the 
manner in which an insurer may make a bona fide denial of 
a claim, the periods of time within which payment is 
required to be made to be timely, and the reasonable interest 
rates to be charged upon late claim payments." 
As part of the regulatory scheme, the legislature specifically provided 
enforcement penalties and procedures for violations of Section 31A-26-301, as 
well as every other insurance statute, including fines, criminal penalties, and 
license suspension or revocation. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-308 (2000). Not 
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surprisingly, the list of enforcement penalties and procedures does not include a 
private right of action. 
The Utah appellate courts have consistently refused to create a private cause 
of action based on the violation of a statute when the statute itself does not 
specifically do so. See, e.g., Cannon v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 994 P. 2d 824, 
828 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the insurance unfair claims settlement 
practices statutes and rules do not give rise to a private right of action); Milliner v. 
Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974). "The courts of this state are not 
generally in the habit of implying a private right of action based upon state law, 
absent some specific direction from the legislature." Broadbent v. Bd. Of. Educ. 
Of Cache Cty., 910 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied,9\l P.2d 
556 (Utah 1996); see also J.H. by D.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115,125 
(Utah 1992) (declining to create private right of action to challenge city's failure to 
follow statutory procedures in hiring officers); Nielson v. Div. Of Peace Officer 
Standards & Training, 851 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding a 
private citizen had no right to compel agency to conduct disciplinary hearings); 
Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (the court refused to 
imply a private cause of action where statute provided for penalty, and there was 
no language regarding a private right of action in the statute). 
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In Milliner, supra, the Utah Supreme Court refused to create a private right 
of action based upon a statute defining certain actions as securities fraud. Though 
the statute made certain conduct criminal, "it [did] not provide for a private right of 
action for its violation." Though the plaintiff urged the court to fashion a remedy, 
the court replied, "we are of the opinion that it is a matter best left to the 
legislature." 529 P.2d at 809. 
Disciplinary measures against an insurer for violations of the Insurance 
Code are enforced by the Insurance Commissioner, not private citizens. The Utah 
Insurance Code creates no private right of action, nor does it indicate any intent by 
the legislature to provide a private right of action. 
In the U.S. District Court, Machan cited Spackman v. Board of Education of 
Box Elder County School Dist. 16 P.3d 533, 538 (Utah 2000) for the proposition 
that the Utah Supreme Court has adopted § 874A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts (1979) and that this Restatement section supports the proposition that a court 
may imply a private cause of action when a statute is silent on the issue. See, 
Plaintiffs Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment at pp. 37-38. In 
Spackman, however, the issue had absolutely nothing to do with state statutes. 
Rather, the issue was whether the Free and Equal Public Education Clause of the 
Utah Constitution (Art. X, § 1) and/or the Due Process Clause of the Utah 
Constitution (Art. I, § 7) are self-executing constitutional provisions that may be 
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directly enforced without implementing legislation. The Court's reliance on 
section 874A was limited solely to Constitutional provisions, not statutes, and 
Spackman does not aid Machan's position. 
Finally, a judicially created private cause of action based on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-26-301 would completely eviscerate years of jurisprudence by removing the 
"fairly debatable" defense from insurance law. See, Prince v. Bear River Mutual 
Ins. Co., supra. Under current case law insurers are not subject to bad faith 
liability when a claim is fairly debatable. Creation of a private cause of action for 
Section 31 A-26-301 would render the Court's bad faith jurisprudence meaningless. 
In summary, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301 did not provide a private cause 
ofactionin2000. 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. District Court should be advised that with respect to the first 
question certified, that the answer is "no". In a first party insurance situation an 
insured may not recover consequential damages, other than attorney's fees, for 
breach of the express terms of an insurance contract. We further suggest that the 
U.S. District Court should be advised that Utah law no longer allows an award of 
attorney's fees as consequential damages for breach of the express terms of an 
insurance policy. 
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With respect to the second question certified, the U.S. District court should 
again be advised that the answer is "no". Utah Code Ann. §31 A-26-301, entitled 
"Timely Payment of Claims" did not allow a private cause of action by the insured 
against his or her insurer for violation of the statute in 2000. 
DATED this 17th day of February, 2004. 
Scott M. Petersen 
P. Bruce Badger 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys Co-Appellant UNUM Life 
Insurance Company of America 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUBf; ^M/f 




UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
AMERICA, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 2:00-CV-00904PGC 
ORDER OF CERTIFICATION 
The United States District Court for the District of Utah, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby certifies the following questions of law which are 
controlling in the above-captioned matter now pending before this Court. 
1. In a first party insurance situation, may an insured recover consequential 
damages, other than attorney's fees, for breach of the express terms of an insurance contract? If 
so, what are the consequential damages that are recoverable for breach of the express terms of an 
insurance contract and how arc they distinguished from the consequential damages for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that are recoverable under Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985)? 
2. Did Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301, entitled "Timely Payment of Claims," allow 
a private cause of action by the insured against his or her insurer for violation of the statute in 
2000? 
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. This case arises out of the claimed failure of defendant UNUM Life Insurance 
Company of America ("UNUM") to pay disability benefits to plaintiff, Gary Machan, under the 
terms of a disability income insurance policy. 
2. Mr. Machan submitted two claims to UNUM under his disability income policy: 
1) in March, 1999, following cardiac bypass surgery; and 2) in April, 2000, asserting mental 
impairment as a result of the earlier bypass surgery. Very briefly, UNUM claimed that Mr. 
Machan was either not entitled to the benefits he was claiming, or that UNUM lacked sufficient 
information to determine whether benefits were owed. 
3. This case was removed from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on November 17,2000. 
4. The complaint averred five claims for relief: (1) breach of the express terms of 
the insurance contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) 
intentional and/or negligent misrepresentation; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 
and (5) breach of statutory duties. Mr. Machan has represented to the court that his bad faith 
claim relates solely to his second claim for benefits. 
5. Mr. Machan claimed that as a consequence of UNUM's denial of benefits, he 
suffered consequential damages, including: (1) worsening of his psychological condition; (2) 
inability to afford psychological treatment for himself and his mentally ill son; (3) depletion of 
his assets and savings in order to meet basic living expenses; and (4) the inability to have any 
significant gainful employment due to his worsened psychological condition. 
2 
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6. In September 2002, while this lawsuit was pending, UNUM made a determination 
to pay Mr. Machan his full monthly benefits under his disability policy retroactive to March 
1999. 
7. UNUM filed a motion for summary judgment in June, 2003, challenging each 
claim for relief in the complaint. The court has taken the motion for summary judgment under 
advisement. 
8. UNUM'S motion for summary judgment raised the issue of whether an insured in 
a first party situation may recover consequential damages, other than attorney's fees (which 
UNUM concedes are recoverable under existing case law), for breach of the express terms of the 
insurance contract. UNUM's motion also raised the issue of whether a private cause of action 
exists under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301 ("Timely Payment of Claims")- These issues have 
led to the certified question and are addressed in the Discussion below. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Consequential Damages 
UNUM asserted in its summary judgment motion that under Beck v. Farmers Insurance, 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) and Billings v. Union Bankers Insurance Company, 918 P. 
2d 461 (Utah 1996), the only damages available to Mr. Machan for breach of the express terms 
of his insurance contract are the insurance benefits under the policy (which have been paid to 
date), prejudgment interest assuming the criteria are met, and attorneys fees if Mr. Machan can 
prove that the fees were foreseeable at the time the parties entered into the insurance contract. 
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UNUM contends that consequential damages, other than attorney's fees, are not recoverable for 
bare breach of an insurance contract. 
UNUM urged that according to Beck and Billings, consequential damages, other than 
attorney's fees, are recoverable only for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in order to remove any incentive for insurers to breach the duty of good faith by 
expanding their exposure beyond the predictable fixed dollar amount of coverage provided by 
the policy. UNUM argued that this incentive would be abrogated if these same consequential 
damages are made available for breach of the express covenants in an insurance contract. To 
allow an insured to recover damages beyond the policy coverage in the absence of bad faith 
would effectively deny any careful insurer the option of declining to pay a contested claim and 
awaiting the outcome of the dispute. 
UNUM further agued that the consequential damages claimed by Mr. Machan, i.e., 
worsening of his psychological condition, inability to afford psychological treatment for himself 
and his mentally ill son, depletion of his assets and savings in order to meet basic living 
expenses, and the inability to have any significant gainful employment due to his worsened 
psychological condition, assuming that Mr. Machan can otherwise prove that these claimed 
losses meet the criteria for consequential damages, fall within the scope of consequential 
damages that Beck and Billings said are the remedy for breach of the covenant of good faith in 
order to remove any incentive for insurers to breach their implied covenant. Finally, UNUM 
argued that its position has been confirmed by statements made recently by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 2001 UT 89, 432 Utah 
4 
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Adv. Rep. 44, 2001 Utah LEXIS 170 (Utah 2001), rev 'd on other grounds, _ U.S. , 123 
S.Ct. 1513(2003). 
In response to UNUM's position, Mr. Machan cited, among other authorities, Pacific 
Coast Title Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 325 P.2d 906 (Utah 1958); 
Cratz v. Heritage Imports, 71 P.3d 188, ffif 48-51 (Utah App. 2003); and Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, § 351, and argued that under general contract law, damages which are reasonably 
foreseeable to the parties when the contract was made, have always been recoverable, indeed, 
since the days of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341,156 Emg. Rep. 145 (1854). Mr. Machan 
contends that when allowing a broad range of tort-like damages under a breach of implied 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing (as set forth in Beck, supra) that the Utah Supreme Court 
did not abrogate the recovery of well recognized consequential damages arising from a breach of 
contract. Instead, the Court simply expanded the remedies where the insurer has also breached 
the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. 
Mr. Machan asserted that the "incentive" theory urged by UNUM to justify a partial 
abrogation of general contract law regarding damages, exists without eliminating historical 
damages, since insurers have adequate incentive to avoid liability for a much broader range of 
tort-like damages available under a breach of the implied covenant of good faith. Mr. Machan 
argued that Billings, instead of restricting historical contract damages, held only that without a 
violation of the implied covenants, this broad range of tort-like damages is not recoverable. To 
reach any other position, concluded Mr. Machan, would give unfair preferential treatment to 
insurance companies over all other non-insurance parties who breach contracts. 
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Mr. Machan proffered evidence that, based on the testimony of UNUM's representatives 
and based on UNUM's own marketing material, it was foreseeable to UNUM that if UNUM 
breaches the insurance contract, Mr. Machan would suffer consequential damages beyond the 
insurance benefits. 
2. Utah Code Ann.S 31A-26-301 
The applicable part of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-26-301(l), effective in 2000, stated: 
Unless otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall timely pay every 
valid insurance claim made by an insured. 
UNUM asserted in its summary judgment motion that § 31A-26-301(l) does not provide 
a private cause of action; that absent specific direction from the legislature, Utah Courts 
routinely decline to create private rights of action based on alleged violations of statutes. See 
e.g., Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974); Broadbent v. Bd. ofEduc. of 
Cache Cty.9 910 P.2d 1274,1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 917 P. 2d 556 (Utah 1996); 
J.H. v. D.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115, 125 (Utah 1992); Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren, 
880 P. 2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). No Utah decision has ever recognized a private cause of 
action under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301. 
In response to UNUM's position, Mr. Machan argued that he is a member of the class of 
persons which the statute was designated to protect and that the elements necessary to imply a 
private right of action are met, citing Spackman v. B.D. of Ed. Box Elder County School District, 
16 P.3d 533, 538 (Utah 2000), and § 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979). Mr. 
Machan further argued that the expressed purpose of the Utah Insurance Code, including Chapter 
26, is to protect claimants under insurance policies form unfair claims adjustment practices. 
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 31 A-102(2) and 31 A-26-10l(3). Mr. Machan also contends that the 
statutory language itself demonstrates a legislative intent to create a private cause of action. 
Finally, Mr. Machan argued that the legislative history of § 31A-26-301 demonstrates an intent 
to allow a private cause of action. 
It appears to the court that the issue of whether Section 31 A-26-301 provided a private 
cause of action in the year 2000 is closely related to the consequential damages issue, and that 
both questions overlap and are complimentary. For these reasons, the court seeks an answer as 
to whether Section 31 A-26-301 provided a private cause of action in 2000. 
The two questions that are certified are controlling in this case. Mr. Machan claims to 
have suffered consequential damage from the denial of disability benefits. The issue is neither 
trivial, nor is it collateral. Having found no controlling Utah law to resolve these issues, and 
upon the belief that the issue concerning Section 31 A-26-301 is complimentary to the 
consequential damages question, and in the interest of cooperative federalism, the court believes 
that these questions of Utah law presented in this case are best answered by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This Court concludes that the questions of law outlined above are unsettled under 
existing Utah law. Accordingly, the clerk of this Court shall transmit a copy of this Order of 
Certification to counsel for all parties to the proceedings in this Court. The clerk shall also 
submit to the Utah Supreme Court a certified copy of this Order of Certification, together with 
the parties' respective summary judgment memoranda, the hearing transcript for July 29,2003, 
and any other portion of the record before this Court that may be required by the Utah Supreme 
7 
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Court. Pursuant to Rule 41(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court orders that 
each party shall bear its own fees and costs of this certification. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this ^ d a y of ^ti^W , 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Paul G. Cassell 
United States District Court 
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the former licensee may not apply for a new license for five 
years without the express approval of the commissioner. 
(6) Any person whose license is suspended or revoked under 
Subsection (2) shall, when the suspension ends or a new 
Hcense is issued, pay all fees that would have been payable if 
the license had not been suspended or revoked, unless the 
commissioner by order waives the payment of the interim fees. 
If a new license is issued more than three years after the 
revocation of a similar license, this subsection applies only to 
the fees that would have accrued during the three years 
immediately following the revocation. 
(7) The division shall promptly withhold, suspend, restrict, 
or reinstate the use of a license issued under this part if so 
ordered by a court. 1997 
31A-26-214. P r o b a t i o n . 
(1) In any circumstances that would justify a suspension 
under Section 31A-26-213, the commissioner may instead, 
after a formal adjudicative proceeding, put the licensee on 
probation for a specified period no longer than 24 months. 
(2) The probation order shall state the conditions for reten-
tion of the license, which shall be reasonable. 
(3) Violation of the probation is grounds for revocation 
pursuant to any proceeding authorized under Title 63, Chap-
ter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 1997 
P A R T H I 
CLAIM P R A C T I C E S 
31A-26-301. Timely payment of claims. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall 
timely pay every valid insurance claim made by an insured. 
By rule the commissioner may prescribe the kinds of notice 
and proof of loss that will establish validity, the manner in 
which an insurer may make a bona fide denial of a claim, the 
periods of time within which payment is required to be made 
to be timely, and the reasonable interest rates to be charged 
upon late claim payments. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the payment of a claim 
is not overdue during any period in which the insurer is 
unable to pay the claim because there is no recipient legally 
able to give a valid release for the payment, or in which the 
insurer is unable to determine who is entitled to receive the 
payment, provided that the insurer has promptly notified the 
claimant of the inability and has offered in good faith to pay 
the claim promptly when the inability is removed. 
(3) This section applies only to claims made by claimants in 
direct privity of contract with the insurer. 1985 
31A-26-301.5. Health care claims practices. 
(1) Except as provided in Section 31A-8-407, an insured 
retains ultimate responsibility for paying for health care 
services the insured receives. If a service is covered by one or 
more individual or group health insurance policies, all insur-
ers covering the insured have the responsibility to pay valid 
health care claims in a timely manner according to the terms 
and limits specified in the policies. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Section 31A-22-610.1, a 
health care provider may bill and collect for any deduct-
ible, copayment, or uncovered service. 
(b) A health care provider may bill an insured for 
services covered by health insurance policies or may 
otherwise notify the insured of the expenses covered by 
the policies. However, a provider may not make any report 
to a credit bureau, use the services of a collection agency, 
or use .methods other than routine billing or notification 
until the later of: 
(i) 15 days after the date all insurance companies 
covering the insured have paid their portion of the 
claim covered by the policies; 
(ii) 60 days from the date all insurers covering the 
insured are billed for the covered service; or 
(hi) in the case of medicare beneficiaries or retirees 
65 years of age or older, 60 days from the date 
medicare determines its liability for the claim, 
(c) Beginning October 31, 1992, all insurers covering 
the insured shall notify the insured of payment and the 
amount of payment made to the provider. 
(3) The commissioner shall make rules consistent with this 
chapter governing disclosure to the insured of customary 
charges by health care providers on the explanation of benefits 
as part of the claims payment process. These rules shall be 
limited to the form and content of the disclosures on the 
explanation of benefits, and shall include: 
r (a) a requirement that the method of determination of 
any specifically referenced customary charges and the 
range of the customary charges be disclosed; and 
(b) a prohibition against an implication that the pro-
vider is charging excessively if the provider is: 
(i) a participating provider; and 
(ii) prohibited from balance billing. 2000 
31A-26-302. Sett lement of c la ims in credi t life and 
disability insurance. 
(1) The creditor shall promptly report all claims to the 
insurer or its designated claim representative. The insurer 
shall maintain adequate claims files. All claims shall be 
settled as soon as possible in accordance with the terms of the 
insurance contract. 
(2) The insurer shall pay all claims either by draft drawn 
upon the insurer or by check of the insurer to the order of the 
claimant to whom payment of the claim is due pursuant to the 
policy provisions, or upon direction of that claimant to an-
other. 
(3) No person other than the insurer or its designated claim 
representative may settle or adjust claims. The creditor may 
not be designated as a claims representative. 1985 
31A-26-303. Unfair claim settlement practices. 
(1) No insurer or person representing an insurer may 
engage in any unfair claim settlement practice under Subsec-
tions (2), (3), and (4). 
(2) Each of the following acts is an unfair claim settlement 
practice: 
(a) knowingly misrepresenting material facts or the 
contents of insurance policy provisions at issue in connec-
tion with a claim under an insurance contract; however, 
this provision does not include the failure to disclose 
information; 
(b) attempting to use a policy application which was 
altered by the insurer without notice to, or knowledge, or 
consent of, the insured as the basis for settling or refusing 
to settle a claim; or 
(c) failing to settle a claim promptly under one portion 
of the insurance policy coverage, where liability and the 
amount of loss are reasonably clear, in order to influence 
settlements under other portions of the insurance policy 
coverage, but this Subsection (2)(c) applies only to claims 
made by persons in direct privity of contract with the 
insurer. 
(3) Each of the following is an unfair claim settlement 
practice if committed or performed with such frequency as to 
indicate a general business practice by an insurer or persons 
representing an insurer: 
(a) failing to acknowledge and act promptly upon com-
munications about claims under insurance policies; 
(b) failing to adopt and implement reasonable stan-
dards for the prompt investigation and processing of 
claims under insurance policies; 
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is filed under Subsection (2). After the filing of the 
complaint, only the attorney general may compromise the 
forfeiture. 
(2) When a person fails to comply with an order issued 
under Subsection 31A-2-20K4), including a forfeiture order, 
the commissioner may file an action in any court of competent 
jurisdiction or obtain a court order or judgment: 
(a) enforcing the commissioner's order; 
(b) (i) directing compliance with the commissioner's 
order and restraining further violation of the order; 
and 
(ii) subjecting the person ordered to the procedures 
and sanctions available to the court for punishing 
contempt if the failure to comply continues; or 
(c) imposing a forfeiture in an amount the court con-
siders just, up to $10,000 for each day the failure to 
comply continues after the filing of the complaint until 
judgment is rendered. 
(3) The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern actions 
brought under Subsection (2), except that the commissioner 
may file a complaint seeking a court-ordered forfeiture under 
Subsection (2)(c) no sooner than two weeks after giving 
written notice of the commissioner's intention to proceed 
under Subsection (2)(c). The commissioner's order issued 
under Subsection 31A-2-20K4) may contain a notice of inten-
tion to seek a court-ordered forfeiture if the commissioner's 
order is disobeyed. 
(4) If, after a court order is issued under Subsection (2), the 
person fails to comply with the commissioner's order or 
judgment: 
(a) the commissioner may certify the fact of the failure 
to the court by affidavit; and 
(b) the court may, after a hearing following at least five 
days written notice to the parties subject to the order or 
judgment, amend the order or judgment to add the 
forfeiture or forfeitures, as prescribed in Subsection (2Xc), 
until the person complies. 
(5) (a) The proceeds of all forfeitures under this section, 
including collection expenses, shall be paid into the Gen-
eral Fund. 
(b) The expenses of collection shall be credited to the 
Insurance Department's budget. 
(c) The attorney general's budget shall be credited to 
the extent the Insurance Department reimburses the 
attorney general's office for its collection expenses under 
this section. 
(6) (a) Forfeitures and judgments under this section bear 
interest at the rate charged by the United States Internal 
Revenue Service for past due taxes on the: 
(i) date of entry of the commissioner's order under 
Subsection (1); or 
(ii) date of judgment under Subsection (2). 
(b) Interest accrues from the later of the dates de-
scribed in Subsection (6)(a) until the forfeiture and ac-
crued interest are fully paid. 
(7) A forfeiture may not be imposed under Subsection (2)(c) 
if: 
(a) at the time the forfeiture action is commenced, the 
person was in compliance with the commissioner's order; 
or 
(b) the violation of the order occurred during the or-
der's suspension. 
(8) The commissioner may seek an injunction as an alter-
native to issuing an order under Subsection 31A-2-20K4). 
(9) (a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if that 
person: 
(i) intentionally violates: 
(A) an insurance statute or rule of this state; 
or 
(B) an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-
201(4); 
(ii) intentionally permits a person over whom that 
person has authority to violate: 
(A) an insurance statute or rule of this state; 
or 
(B) an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-
201(4); or 
(iii) intentionally aids any person in violating: 
(A) an insurance statute or rule of this state; 
or 
(B) an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-
201(4). 
(b) Unless a specific criminal penalty is provided else-
where in this title, the person may be fined not more than: 
(i) $10,000 if a corporation; or 
(ii) $5,000 if a person other than a corporation. 
(c) If the person is an individual, the person may, in 
. addition, be imprisoned for up to one year. 
(d) As used in this Subsection (9), "intentionally" has 
the same meaning as under Subsection 76-2-103(1). 
(10) (a) After a hearing, the commissioner may, in whole or 
in part, revoke, suspend, place on probation, limit, or 
refuse to renew the licensee's license or certificate of 
authority: 
(i) when a licensee of the department, other than a 
domestic insurer: 
(A) persistently or substantially violates the 
insurance law; or 
(B) violates an order of the commissioner un-
der Subsection 31A-2-20K4); 
(ii) if there are grounds for delinquency proceed-
ings against the licensee under Section 31A-27-301 or 
Section 31A-27-307; or 
(iii) if the licensee's methods and practices in the 
conduct of the licensee's business endanger, or the 
licensee's financial resources are inadequate to safe-
guard, the legitimate interests of the licensee's cus-
tomers and the public, 
(b) Additional license termination or probation provi-
sions for licensees other than insurers are set forth in 
Sections 31A-19a-303, 31A-19a-304, 31A-23-216, 31A-23-
217, 31A-25-208, 31A-25-209, 31A-26-213, 31A-26-214, 
31A-35-501, and 31A-35-503. 
(11) The enforcement penalties and procedures set forth in 
this section are not exclusive, but are cumulative of other 
rights and remedies the commissioner has pursuant to appli-
cable law. 1999 
31A-2-309. Service of process through state officer. 
(1) The commissioner, or the lieutenant governor when the 
subject proceeding is brought by the state, is the agent for 
receipt of service of any summons, notice, order, pleading, or 
any other legal process relating to a Utah court or adminis-
trative agency upon the following: 
(a) all insurers authorized to do business in this state, 
while authorized to do business in this state, and there-
after in any proceeding arising from or related to any 
transaction having a connection with this state; 
(b) all surplus lines insurers for any proceeding arising 
out of a contract of insurance that is subject to the surplus 
lines law, or out of a certificate, cover note, or other 
confirmation of that type of insurance; 
(c) all unauthorized insurers or other persons assisting 
unauthorized insurers under Subsection 3 LA-15-102(1) by 
doing an act specified in Subsection 31A-15-102(2), for a 
proceeding arising out of the transaction that is subject to 
the unauthorized insurance law; 
(d) any nonresident agent, broker, consultant, adjuster, 
and third party administrator, while authorized to do 
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(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to the extent that 
the law specifically provides otherwise. 1991 
31A-2-303. Notice. 
(1) If the commissioner determines that the number of 
persons affected by a proposed action is so great as to render 
it impracticable to serve each person affected with a copy of an 
order, notice of hearing, or other notice, the commissioner 
shall: 
(a) provide a copy of the order, notice of hearing, or 
other notice to all persons who have filed with the 
department a general request to be informed of this type 
of action, or if fewer than ten persons have requested this 
type of notice, provide a copy to those who have and also 
to others affected by the notice or order so that at least ten 
persons receive the notice or order who are collectively 
representative of the class of persons whose legal status, 
pecuniary interests, or other substantial interests will be 
affected by the proposed action; and 
(b) publish a copy of the order, notice of hearing, or 
other notice under Subsection (2). 
(2) When this title requires the commissioner to publish an 
order, notice of hearing, or other document in newspapers, the 
commissioner shall cause the notice or order to be published at 
least once during each of the four weeks preceding the 
hearing, effective date, or other critical event, in at least two 
newspapers with sufficient circulation and appropriate loca-
tion to best provide actual notice. 1987 
31A-2-304. Auxiliary procedural powers. 
The commissioner, or his delegate authorized for a particu-
lar matter over his handwritten signature, may administer 
oaths, take testimony, issue subpoenas, and take depositions 
in connection with any hearing, meeting, examination, inves-
tigation, or other proceeding that the commissioner may 
conduct. The subpoena shall have the same effect and shall be 
served in the same manner as if issued from a court of record. 
Sections 78-24-7 and 78-32-15 apply to the enforcement of the 
process issued by the commissioner or his delegate. 1985 
31A-2-305. Immunity from prosecution. 
(1) If a natural person declines to appear, testify, or produce 
any record or document in any proceeding instituted by the 
commissioner or in obedience to the subpoena of the commis-
sioner, the commissioner may apply to a judge of the district 
court where the proceeding is held for an order to the person 
to attend, testify, or produce records or documents as re-
quested by the commissioner. In the event a witness asserts a 
privilege against self-incrimination, testimony and evidence 
from the witness may be compelled pursuant to Title ,77, 
Chapter 22b, Grants of Immunity. 
(2) If a person claims the privilege against self-mcnrimina-
tion and refuses to appear, testify, or produce documents in 
response to probative evidence against him in a proceeding to 
revoke or suspend his license, and if the testimony or docu-
ments would have been admissible as evidence in a court of 
law except for the Fifth Amendment privilege, the refusal to 
appear, testify, or produce documents is, for noncriminal 
proceedings only, rebuttable evidence of the facts on which the 
proceeding is based. 1997 
31A-2-306. Judicial review — Costs. 
(1) A person aggrieved by a rule or order of the commis-
sioner, or aggrieved by the commissioner's failure to act when 
he has a duty to act, may obtain judicial review. 
(2) The court reviewing agency actions governed by this 
title shall give priority to those actions and shall hear and 
determine them promptly. 
(3) Costs shall be awarded as in civil cases. If the court finds 
that the appeal from action or inaction stemmed from the bad 
faith or malice of the commissioner, the court may award 
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing petitioner. Section 
63-30-23 applies to the extent the attorney's fees awarded 
under this subsection exceed $10,000 for any one appeal. 
1987 
31A-2-307. Declaratory interpretation of statutes — 
Procedure. 
(1) The commissioner or any other person with a substan-
tial interest in the result may petition the Third District Court 
for Salt Lake County for a declaratory judgment interpreting 
any provision of this title as applied to stipulated facts. 
(2) The court may require that notice be given to persons 
that may be affected by the judgment. These persons may 
participate in the proceeding. 
(3) The court in its discretion may require the commis-
sioner and any other participating parties to provide testi-
mony and documentary evidence necessary for a fair disposi-
tion of the case. 
(4) The court may decline to proceed on the petition if it 
believes the petition is frivolous, or the declaratory relief is 
unnecessary or has the possibility of prejudicing persons who 
cannot practicably be made parties to the proceeding. 
(5) The court may declare the meaning of the statute. The 
declaration has the effect of a final judgment or decree. 
(6) Any participating party may obtain judicial review of 
the decision. 
(7) The costs of the proceeding shall be paid by the peti-
tioner unless the commissioner is the petitioner, in which case 
all parties shall bear their own costs. "Costs" means: 
(a) fees of the clerk and marshal; 
(b) fees of the court reporter or the transcriber of a tape 
of the proceedings for all or any part of the transcript 
necessarily obtained for use in the case; 
(c) fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; 
(d) fees for exemplification and copies of papers neces-
sarily obtained for use in the case; and 
(e) compensation of court-appointed experts or inter-
preters. Reimbursements shall be made to the General 
Fund, and shall be added back to the department's bud-
get, except to the extent the department forwards a 
reimbursement to the attorney general's office, in which 
case the attorney general's budget shall be credited with 
the reimbursement. 1988 
31A-2-308. Enforcement penalties and procedures. 
(1) (a) A person who violates any insurance statute or rule 
or any order issued under Subsection 31A-2-20H4) shall 
forfeit to the state twice the amount of any profit gained 
from the violation, in addition to any other forfeiture or 
penalty imposed. 
(b) (i) The commissioner may order an individual 
agent, broker, adjuster, or insurance consultant who 
violates an insurance statute or rule to forfeit to the 
state not more than $2,500 for each violation. 
(ii) The commissioner may order any other person 
who violates an insurance statute or rule to forfeit to 
the state not more than $5,000 for each violation. 
(c) (i) The commissioner may order an individual 
agent, broker, adjuster, or insurance consultant who 
violates an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-
201(4) to forfeit to the state not more than $2,500 for 
each violation. Each day the violation continues is a 
separate violation. 
(ii) The commissioner may order any other person 
who violates an order issued under Subsection 31A-
2-201(4) to forfeit to the state not more than $5,000 
for each violation. Each day the violation continues is 
a separate violation. 
(d) The commissioner may accept or compromise any 
forfeiture under this Subsection (1) until after a complaint 
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3O-8-8. Limitations of act ions. 
^ y statute of limitations applicable to an action asserting 
a claim for relief under a premarital agreement is tolled 
during the marriage of the parties to the agreement. 1994 
30-8-9" Application and construct ion. 
This act shall be applied and construed to effectuate its 
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the 






1. General Provisions. ^ ~ 
2. Administration of the Insurance Laws. 
3. Department Funding, Fees, and Taxes. 
4. Insurers in General. 
5. Domestic Stock and Mutual Insurance Corporations. 
6. Service Insurance Corporations [Repealed]. 
6a. Service Contracts. 
7. Nonprofit Health Service Insurance Corporations. 
8. Health Maintenance Organizations and Limited Health 
Plans. 
9. Insurance Fraternals. 
10. Annuities. 
11. Motor Clubs. 
12. State Risk Management Fund. 
13. Employee Welfare Funds and Plans. 
14. Foreign Insurers. 
15. Unauthorized Insurers, Surplus Lines, and Risk Reten-
tion Groups. 
16. Insurance Holding Companies. 
17. Determination of Financial Condition. 
18. Investments. 
19. Rate Regulation [Renumbered]. 
19a. Utah Rate Regulation Act. 
20. Underwriting Restrictions. 
21. Insurance Contracts in General. 
22. Contracts in Specific Lines. 
23. Insurance Marketing — Licensing Agents, Brokers, Con-
sultants, and Reinsurance Intermediaries. 
24. Regulation of Independent Escrows [Repealed]. 
25. Third Party Administrators. 
26. Insurance Adjusters. 
27. Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation. 
28. Guaranty Associations. 
29. Comprehensive Health Insurance Pool Act. 
30. Individual and Small Employer Health Insurance Act. 
31. Insurance Fraud Act. 
32. Medical Care Savings Account Act [Repealed]. 
32a. Medical Care Savings Account Act. 
33. Workers' Compensation Fund. 
34. Voluntary Health Insurance Purchasing Alliance Act, 




Purposes, Scope, and Application 
Section 
31A-1-103. Scope and applicability of title. 
31A-1-104. Authorization to do insurance business. 
31A-1-105. Presumption of jurisdiction. 
31A-1-106. Residual unlicensed domestic insurers. 
31A-1-107. Licensees under former Title 31. 
31A-1-108. Corporations in the process of organizing. 
31A-1-109. Name of licensee. 
PartH 
Construction and Interpretation 
31A-1-201. Construction. 
31A-1-202. Effect of repeal of former provisions. 







PURPOSES, SCOPE, AND APPLICATION 
31A-1-X01. Short title. 






31A-1-102. Purposes . 
The purposes of the Insurance Code are to: 
(1) ensure the solidity of insurers doing business in 
Utah; 
(2) ensure tha t policyholders, claimants, and insurers 
are treated fairly and equitably; 
(3) ensure that Utah has an adequate and healthy 
insurance market , characterized by competitive condi-
tions, the spirit of innovation, and the exercise of initia-
- tive; 
(4) provide for an insurance department that is expert 
in the field of insurance and able to enforce the Insurance 
Code effectively; 
(5) encourage cooperation between the Insurance De-
partment and other Utah regulatory bodies, as well as 
other federal and state governmental entities; 
(6) preserve and improve s ta te regulation of insurance; 
(7) maintain freedom of contract and enterprise; 
(8) encourage self regulation of the insurance industry; 
(9) encourage loss prevention as part of the insurance 
industry; 
(10) keep the public informed on insurance matters; 
and 
(11) achieve other purposes stated elsewhere in the 
Insurance Code. 1985 
31A-1-103. Scope and applicabil ity of title. 
(1) This title does not apply to: .
 ;,. 
(a) retainer contracts made by attorneys^at-law with 
individual clients with fees based on estimates of the 
nature and amount of services to be provided to the 
specific client, and similar contracts made wdth a group of 
clients involved in the same or closely related legal 
matters; 
...• (b) arrangements for providing benefits tha t do not 
exceed a limited amount of consultations, advice on 
simple legal mat ters , either alone or in combination with 
referral services, or the promise of fee discounts for 
handling other legal matters; 
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Glen A. BILLINGS, as guardian ad litem 
for Stanley D. Billings, a protected per-
son, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-Ap-
pellant, 
v. 
UNION BANKERS INSURANCE COM-
PANY, a Texas corporation, Defendant, 
Appellant, and Cross-Appellee. 
No. 940098. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 19, 1996. 
Rehearing Denied July 1, 1996. 
Insured sued catastrophic health insurer 
for breach of contract and bad faith in con-
nection with denial of coverage for costs of 
transitional treatment for brain injuries sus-
tained in motorcycle accident. Following 
jury trial after remand, 819 P.2d 803, the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Les-
lie A. Lewis, J., awarded damages and attor-
ney fees to insured. Insurer appealed and 
insured cross-appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Zimmerman, C.J., held that: (1) first-
party insurer has "fairly debatable" defense 
to claim for breach of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing; (2) insured's 
claim was not rendered fairly debatable as 
matter of law by existence of fact question 
about nature of treatment received; (3) 
broad measure of consequential damages 
awardable for first-party insurer's breach of 
implied covenant is not available for breach 
of contract's express terms; (4) evidence was 
sufficient to sustain verdict for insured under 
theory that he had suffered mental anguish 
as result of insurer's breach of implied cove-
nant; and (5) no evidence supported trial 
court's finding that insured's contingency fee 
arrangement was not foreseeable. 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded. 
Howe, J., filed concurring and dissenting 
opinion in which Russon, J., joined. 
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1. Appeal and Error <s>181 
Supreme Court declined to review chal-
lenges that appellant did not raise below, 
where appellant failed to show special cir-
cumstances warranting such review, as re-
quired for application of "interests of justice" 
exception to waiver principle. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 51. 
2. Appeal and Error ®=>842(2) 
Interpretation of effect of prior judicial 
decision is conclusion of law which Supreme 
Court review for correctness. 
3. Appeal and Error <£=>842(2) 
Although Supreme Court will carefully 
review trial court's conclusion that insured's 
claim is or is not fairly debatable, within 
context of implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, it will grant trial court's conclu-
sion some deference. 
4. Insurance @=>124(1) 
"First-party insurance contract" is in-
surance agreement where insurer agrees to 
pay claims submitted to it by insured for 
losses suffered by insured. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
5. Insurance <§=>602.5 
Under Beck, first-party insurer has 
"fairly debatable" defense to claim for breach 
of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in insurance contract; that is, first-
party insurer may not be held liable for 
breaching implied covenant on ground that it 
wrongfully denied coverage if insured's claim, 
although later found to be proper, was fairly 
debatable at time it was denied. 
6. Insurance <3=>602.2(1) 
Whether first-party insurer has acted 
reasonably when confronted by insured's 
claim, so as to satisfy implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in insurance con-
tract, is objective question to be determined 
without considering insurer's subjective state 
of mind, although this standard is not to be 
construed as one of strict liability. 
7. Insurance <s=»602.12(2) 
Insured's claim for coverage under cata-
strophic health policy for costs of transitional 
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treatment for brain injuries sustained in mo-
torcycle accident was not rendered fairly de-
batable as matter of law by existence of fact 
question about nature of treatment received, 
for purposes of "fairly debatable" defense to 
claim for breach of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in insurance contract, 
especially since there was no determination 
that insurance contract itself was sufficiently 
ambiguous to create fact question. 
8. Insurance <3=>602.10(1) 
Broad measure of consequential dam-
ages awardable for first-party insurer's 
breach of implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing in insurance contract, which in-
cludes such things as mental anguish, is not 
available for breach of contract's express 
terms. 
9. Appeal and Error <S=>842(1) 
Supreme Court reviews challenge to 
jury instructions for correctness, granting 
trial court no deference on its view of the 
law. 
10. Damages <®=»56.10 
Evidence was sufficient to sustain ver-
dict for insured under theory that he had 
suffered mental anguish as result of cata-
strophic health insurer's breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even 
though it did not necessarily compel that 
conclusion. 
11. Appeal and Error <®=>1136 
When civil case is submitted to jury on 
several alternative theories and jury does not 
identify which theory or theories it relied on 
in reaching its verdict, Supreme Court may 
affirm verdict if jury could have properly 
found for prevailing party on any one of 
theories presented. 
12. Appeal and Error <S*1026 
Under harmless error rule, Supreme 
Court will affirm verdict unless it concludes 
that likelihood of different outcome absent 
the error is sufficiently high as to undermine 
confidence in verdict. 
13. Appeal and Error ^930(1) 
In reviewing jury verdict, Supreme 
Court views evidence in light most supportive 
of verdict, and assumes that jury believed 
those aspects of evidence which sustain its 
findings and judgment. 
14. Appeal and Error <s>1003(6) 
Supreme Court will upset jury verdict 
only upon showing that evidence so clearly 
preponderates in favor of appellant that rea-
sonable people would not differ on outcome 
of case. 
15. Insurance <®=>602.9 
No evidence supported trial court's find-
ing that insured's contingency fee arrange-
ment was not foreseeable, for purposes of 
deterniining amount of attorney fees awarda-
ble to insured as consequential damages 
flowing from catastrophic health insurer's 
wrongful denial of coverage for costs of tran-
sitional treatment for brain injuries sustained 
in motorcycle accident. 
16. Insurance <s>602.10(2) 
Attorney fees may be recoverable as 
consequential damages flowing from insur-
er's breach of either express or implied 
terms of insurance contract, though only if 
they were reasonably within contemplation 
of, or reasonably foreseeable by, parties at 
time contract was made. 
17. Appeal and Error <S=>1003(6) 
Supreme Court reverses trial courts 
findings of fact only if they are against clear 
weight of evidence, thus making them clearly 
erroneous. 
L. Rich Humpherys, Mark L. Anderson, 
Stacy L. Hayden, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff. 
Robert S. Campbell, Kevin Egan 
Anderson, Joann Shields, David W. Slagle, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
Glen A. Billings brought this action' on 
behalf of his son Stanley D. Billings ("Bill-
ings") against Union Bankers Insurance 
Company ("Union Bankers"), alleging that 
Union Bankers breached both the express 
terms and the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing contained in a catastrophic 
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health insurance contract. The case was 
tried to a jury, which found a breach of both 
the express and the implied terms of the 
contract and returned a $1,800,000 verdict in 
Billings' favor. The district court also 
awarded Billings "reasonable" attorney fees 
of $110,651 but refused to hold Union Bank-
ers liable for the substantially higher contin-
gency fee which Billings actually incurred. 
Union Bankers appeals the jury verdict, and 
Billings cross-appeals the award of attorney 
fees. We affirm the verdict but vacate the 
award of attorney fees and remand for recal-
culation of Billings' recoverable fees in accor-
dance with his fee agreement. 
In June of 1984, Billings entered into a 
catastrophic health insurance contract with 
Union Bankers in which Union Bankers 
agreed to pay certain medical expenses in-
curred by Billings as a result of injury or 
sickness. Covered expenses included hospi-
tal inpatient services, room, and board; 
skilled nursing facility services, room, and 
board; and home health care services. In 
addition, the policy contained a miscellaneous 
benefits rider in which Union Bankers 
agreed to pay, among other things, certain 
out-of-hospital medical expenses. Through-
out the period of the policy, Billings paid the 
premiums and performed each act required 
to keep the policy in full force and effect. 
On September 22, 1985, Billings was in-
volved in a motorcycle accident in which he 
sustained serious injuries, including traumat-
ic brain injury. He was hospitalized for sev-
eral months following the accident, and pur-
suant to the insurance policy, Union Bankers 
paid Billings' hospitalization expenses. 
In May of 1986, Dr. Goka, Billings' treat-
ing physician at Holy Cross Hospital, deter-
mined that Billings' recovery would be im-
proved if he were transferred to Tangram 
Rehabilitation Network in San Marcos, Texas 
("Tangram"). Tangram is a transitional 
treatment center for individuals who are 
medically stable but who have suffered loss 
of memory or basic functional skills due to 
traumatic brain injury. Billings was admit-
ted to Tangram on May 9, 1986. However, 
Union Bankers denied coverage for Billings' 
treatment at Tangram, stating that the insur-
ance policy did not cover such treatment. 
BANKERS INS. CO. Utah 463 
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Although his condition was improving, Bill-
ings discontinued his treatment at Tangram 
on November 25,1986, due to a lack of funds. 
Billings commenced this action on May 4, 
1988, alleging that Union Bankers breached 
both the express coverage provision and the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing contained in the insurance contract. Bill-
ings sought reimbursement of the expenses 
he incurred at Tangram and consequential 
damages resulting from the premature ter-
mination of treatment, which allegedly pre-
vented Billings from ever achieving his full 
potential for recovery. 
On April 10, 1990, Billings moved for par-
tial summary judgment, seeking a ruling that 
Union Bankers had breached the express 
coverage provision by refusing to pay for 
Billings' treatment at Tangram. The trial 
judge denied Billings' motion "for the reason 
that differing interpretations of the insurance 
policy create genuine issues of material fact 
to be tried." Billings then petitioned this 
court for interlocutory review. We granted 
Billings' petition and affirmed the denial of 
Billings' motion because the "record before 
us . . . fail[ed] to adequately demonstrate the 
nature of the treatment received at Tan-
gram." Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 
819 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1991) {"Billings I"). 
We remanded, and the case proceeded to 
trial. 
Following closing arguments, Union Bank-
ers moved for a directed verdict on Billings' 
claim for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. Union Bankers 
argued that it could not have breached the 
implied covenant as a matter of law because 
its liability under the insurance policy was 
fairly debatable. The district court denied 
Union Bankers' motion but instructed the 
jury that Union Bankers would not be liable 
for breaching the implied covenant if its lia-
bility under the insurance policy was "fairly 
debatable [and] a reasonable insurance com-
pany in similar circumstances [would have] 
den[ied] the claim." The district court also 
instructed the jury that if it found Union 
Bankers to have breached the express cover-
age provision of the insurance contract, it 
could award Billings the value of the insur-
ance policy benefits to which he was entitled 
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and if it found Union Bankers to have li 
breached either the express coverage provi- v. 
sion or the implied covenant of good faith it 
and fair dealing, it could award Billings con- ii 
sequential damages for emotional suffering E 
and mental anguish, medical expenses, lost d 
income and earning capacity, and the extent tl 
to which Billings had been limited in pursu- c< 
ing and enjoying the ordinary affairs of life, t] 
Although Billings also sought to recover his ": 
attorney's contingency fee as consequential b 
damages, the parties agreed to reserve this a 
issue until after the trial. ii 
Following the trial, the jury re turned a ° 
special verdict finding that Union Bankers 
had breached both the implied covenant of <j 
good faith and fair dealing and the express £ 
coverage provision of the insurance contract.
 0 
I t awarded Billings $1,800,000. The district ^ 
court subsequently addressed the attorney \g 
fee issue and awarded Billings what it deter- g 
mined to be a reasonable attorney fee of i 
$110,651. p 
[1] On appeal, Union Bankers argues c^ 
that the district court erred in (i) denying *£ 
Union Bankers ' motion for a directed verdict Si 
on Billings' claim for breach of the implied (' 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and " 
(ii) instructing the ju ry that it could award a 
damages for mental anguish caused by Union '^ 
Bankers ' breach of the insurance contract's 3 
express coverage provision.1 Billings cross- C( 
appeals the award of attorney fees. We w 
address Union Bankers ' arguments first and 
then consider Billings' cross-appeal. * 
Union Bankers first argues tha t the dis- ~, 
trict court should have granted its motion for 
a directed verdict on Billings' claim for , 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. Union Bankers contends 
ei 
that under our decision in Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1985), a first-party insurer may not be held h< 
1. Union Bankers also raises various other chal-
lenges to the jury instructions and to the special 
verdict form, none of which were raised below. 
Union Bankers' failure to object at trial pre-
cludes our consideration of these issues on ap-
peal unless, in our discretion, we conclude that 
the "interests of justice" would be served by 
addressing the issues. Utah R.Civ.P. 51. We 
have held that before this exception to the waiver 
principle is available to a party, that party must 
i iable for breaching the implied covenant 
 where the basis for the alleged breach is that 
i it wrongfully denied coverage and where the 
- insured's claim was fairly debatable. Union 
l Bankers argues that Billings' claim was fairly 
t debatable as a mat ter of law and therefore 
t tha t it could not have breached the implied 
- covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Al-
:. though we agree that Beck established a 
3 "fairly debatable" defense to a claim for 
1 breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
3 and fair dealing, we do not think tha t Bill-
ings' claim was fairly debatable as a matter 
l of law. 
3 [2 ,3] We first state the applicable stan-
dard of review. Whether Beck established a 
5
 fairly debatable defense to a claim for breach 
of the implied covenant based on an insurer's 
k wrongful denial of coverage is a question of 
1
 law which we review for correctness. See 
m
 State v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 
f
 1994) ("[T]he interpretation of the effect of a 
prior judicial decision . . . constitutes a con-
, elusion of law to which we accord no particu-
r lar deference. Review is for correctness."); 
I see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 
[ (Utah 1994). Whether an insured's claim is 
} fairly debatable under a given set of facts is 
[ also a question of law. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 
x 936 ("[T]he effect of a given set of facts is a 
5 question of law."). However, because of the 
complexity and variety of the facts upon 
, which the fairly debatable determination de-
[ pends, the legal standard under which this 
determination is made conveys some discre-
tion to trial judges. See id. a t 938-59. 
Therefore, although we will carefully review 
a trial court's conclusion tha t an insured's 
claim is or is not fairly debatable, we will 
g ran t the trial court's conclusion some defer-
' ence. See id. 
[4] Because our decision today turns 
heavily on our holding in Beck, we examine 
make a showing of " 'special circumstances war-
ranting such a review.' " Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991) (quoting 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988)). 
Like the appealing party in Crookston, Union 
Bankers has not begun to make this required 
showing. We therefore decline to consider its 
additional challenges to die jury instructions and 
special verdict form. 
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that case in detail here. Like the instant 
case, Beck involved an alleged breach of a 
first-party insurance contract, i.e., "an insur-
ance agreement where the insurer agrees to 
pay claims submitted to it by the insured for 
losses suffered by the insured." Beck 701 
P.2d at 798 n. 2. In Beck we held that the 
relationship between an insurer and its in-
sured in the first-party context is contractual 
rather than fiduciary and that "as parties to 
a contract, the insured and the insurer have 
parallel obligations to perform the contract in 
good faith, obligations that inhere in every 
contractual relationship." Id. at 800-01. We 
then explained: 
[T]he implied obligation of good faith per-
formance contemplates, at the very least, 
that the insurer will diligently investigate 
the facts to enable it to determine whether 
a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the 
claim, and will thereafter act promptly and 
reasonably in rejecting or settling the 
claim. 
Id. at 801. 
[5,6] The first question presented is 
whether, under Beck a first-party insurer 
may be held liable for breaching the implied 
covenant on the ground that it wrongfully 
denied coverage if the insured's claim, al-
though later found to be proper, was fairly 
debatable at the time it was denied. The 
answer lies in the nature of the duties im-
posed by the covenant on an insurer: when 
confronted with a claim for benefits by a 
first-party insured, the insurer must "dili-
gently investigate the facts . . . , fairly evalu-
ate the claim, and . . . act promptly and 
reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim." 
Id. (emphasis added). The terms used to 
characterize these duties plainly indicate that 
the overriding requirement imposed by the 
implied covenant is that insurers act reason-
ably, as an objective matter, in dealing with 
2. We emphasize that whether an insurer has 
acted reasonably is an objective question to be 
determined without considering the insurer's 
subjective state of mind. As we said in Beck v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 800 
(Utah 1985), the "state of mind of the insurer is 
irrelevant; even an inadvertent breach of the 
covenant of good faith implied in an insurance 
contract can substantially harm the insured and 
warrants a remedy." This statement could be 
read as suggesting that the covenant of good 
BANKERS INS. CO. Utah 465 
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their insureds.2 It is entirely consistent with 
this overall approach to hold that when an 
insured's claim is fairly debatable, the insur-
er is entitled to debate it and cannot be held 
to have breached the implied covenant if it 
chooses to do so. McLaughlin v. Alabama 
Farm Bureau Mut Cas. Ins. Co., 437 So.2d 
86, 90 (Ala.1983); cf. Western Cas. & Sur. Co. 
v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 1980) 
("It would not comport with our ideas of 
either law or justice to prevent any party 
who entertains bona fide questions about his 
legal obligations from seeking adjudication 
thereon in the courts."). Therefore, we con-
clude that Beck established a fairly debatable 
defense to a claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
[7] Having agreed with Union Bankers' 
construction of Beck, we next address its 
contention that the district court should have 
granted its motion for a directed verdict 
because Billings' claim was fairly debatable 
as a matter of law. Union Bankers argues 
that this court's conclusion in Billings I that 
a material issue of fact existed as to whether 
Union Bankers breached the express cover-
age provision was tantamount to a conclusion 
that Billings' claim for benefits was fairly 
debatable. We disagree. 
In Billings I, Billings contended that the 
trial court erred in refusing to grant him 
partial summary judgment on the question of 
whether his treatment at Tangram was cov-
ered by the express terms of the insurance 
policy. We affirmed the trial court, reason-
ing that Billings had not adduced sufficient 
factual information regarding the nature of 
the treatment he received at Tangram to 
enable us to reach the legal question of 
whether that treatment was covered. Bill-
ings I, 819 P.2d at 805. In the present 
proceeding, Union Bankers assumes that it 
faith and fair dealing imposes something akin to 
strict liability, i.e., if a claim is denied and a 
court later determines it should have been grant-
ed, the insurer is liable for breaching the implied 
covenant, regardless of how reasonable it was to 
deny coverage. On the contrary, this statement 
in Beck was intended only to disavow any impli-
cation that a "bad faith" state of mind is neces-
sary to show a breach of the implied covenant, 
not to impose strict liability on insurers. 
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prevailed in Billings I because the contract 
provision in question was determined to be 
ambiguous, thus leaving the factual question 
of coverage for the jury to decide. However, 
this is a misreading of Billings I. We never 
reached the question of whether the insur-
ance policy was sufficiently ambiguous to cre-
ate a fact question. Had such a determina-
tion been made, there might well be merit to 
Union Bankers' assertion. However, be-
cause we made no such determination, we 
cannot conclude that Billings' claim was fair-
ly debatable as a matter of law. According-
ly, we affirm the jury's finding that Union 
Bankers is liable for breaching the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
[8,9] Union Bankers next contends that 
the district court erred in instructing the 
jury that it could award Billings the same 
broad types of consequential damages for 
breach of the insurance contract's express 
coverage provision as it could award under 
Beck for breach of the implied covenant. We 
review Union Bankers' challenge to the jury 
instructions for correctness, granting the tri-
al court no deference on its view of the law. 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 862 
P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993). 
Again, because our decision on this issue 
revolves around our holding in Beck, we refer 
to that case in some detail. Beck did not 
deal with a breach of the underlying insur-
ance contract's express provisions, but only 
with a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. After settling on a 
contract, as opposed to a tort, theory upon 
which to base the plaintiffs claim, we dis-
cussed the types of damages recoverable for 
the breach. We began with the general rule 
that "[d]amages recoverable for breach of 
contract include both general damages, ie., 
those flowing naturally from the breach, and 
consequential damages, ie., those reasonably 
within the contemplation of, or reasonably 
foreseeable by, the parties at the time the 
contract was made." Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. 
We recognized that in appropriate circum-
stances, "consequential damages for breach 
of contract may reach beyond the bare con-
tract terms," id. at 801-02 (citing Bevan v. 
J.H. Constr. Co., 669 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 
1983); Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 
325 P.2d 906, 908 (1958)), and therefore, that 
the monetary limits of an insurance policy do 
not invariably define the amount for which 
the insurer may be liable upon a breach. Id. 
at 801. Under this framework, we proceeded 
to craft a damage measure for Beck's rather 
unique contract approach to the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. 
The Beck court observed that although it 
had rejected the tort approach, the measure 
of damages that the law made available for 
breach of the implied covenant should "not 
ignor[e] the principal reason for [other 
courts'] adoption of the [otherwise theoreti-
cally unsound] tort approach," i.e., to remove 
any incentive for insurers to breach the duty 
of good faith by expanding their exposure to 
damages caused by such a breach beyond the 
predictable fixed dollar amount of coverage 
provided by the policy. Id, In furtherance 
of this purpose, we departed from the re-
strictive traditional contract damages ap-
proach and followed a course more closely 
aligned with a tort damages approach. The 
Beck court concluded that a first-party insur-
er who breaches the implied covenant by 
unreasonably denying the insured the bene-
fits bargained for may be held liable for 
broad consequential damages foreseeabiy 
caused by the breach, damages which might 
include those for mental anguish and which 
would be closely analogous to those available 
in states taking a tort approach. Id. at 802. 
Against this background, we consider Union 
Bankers' claim. 
Union Bankers asserts that this expanded 
consequential damage measure should be 
available only for breach of the implied cove-
nant, not, as the trial court instructed the 
jury, for breach of the express terms of the 
contract. We agree. As noted above, the 
implied covenant imposes a duty on first-
party insurers to act in an objectively reason-
able manner in handling an insured's claim. 
It would not further Beck's purpose of en-
couraging insurers to act reasonably if we 
were to impose the broad consequential dam-
ages allowed in Beck on every insurer who is 
ultimately determined by a court to have 
incorrectly denied coverage, regardless of 
how reasonable the denial. Such an insurer 
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ought to incur no greater damage exposure 
than any other person breaching the express 
terms of a contract. Indeed, it would be 
unfair not to permit an insurer who has a 
legitimate dispute with an insured over a 
claim to have the dispute resolved before 
having to pay the claim. Exposure to the 
sweeping measure of damages available for 
breach of the implied covenant would effec-
tively deny any careful insurer the option of 
declining to pay a contested claim and await-
ing the outcome of the dispute. Therefore, 
we hold that the trial court erred in instruct-
ing the jury that it could award broad conse-
quential damages for breach of either the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing or the express terms of the insurance 
contract. 
[10] We must now determine the conse-
quences of this instructional error. Union 
Bankers asserts that because the jury's spe-
cial verdict did not identify what portion, if 
any, of Billings' damages were awarded pur-
suant to the erroneous instruction, we must 
vacate the entire damage award and remand 
for a redetermination of Billings' recoverable 
damages under proper instructions. We dis-
agree. 
[11,12] When a civil case is submitted to 
a jury on several alternative theories and the 
jury does not identify which theory or theo-
ries it relied on in reaching its verdict, we 
may affirm the verdict if the jury could have 
properly found for the prevailing party on 
any one of the theories presented. See Cam-
belt InVl Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 
1241-42 (Utah 1987) (citing Barson v. E.R. 
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 
1984)).3 Because the jury in the instant case 
was properly instructed that it could award 
broad consequential damages for breach of 
the implied covenant, we may affirm the 
verdict if the evidence presented at trial is 
sufficient to sustain the verdict under that 
alternative theory of recovery. We conclude 
that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the 
verdict. 
3. This rule is essentially a refined version of the 
harmless error rule, under which we will affirm 
a verdict unless we conclude that "the likelihood 
• BANKERS INS. CO. Utah 467 
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[13,14] In reviewing a jury verdict, "we 
view the evidence in the light most support-
ive of the verdict, and assume that the jury 
believed those aspects of the evidence which 
sustain its findings and judgment." EA 
Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc. v. W.C. Foy & 
Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983) 
(citations omitted). Accordingly, we will "up-
set a jury verdict 'only upon a showing that 
the evidence so clearly preponderates in fa-
vor of the appellant that reasonable people 
would not differ on the outcome of the 
case.' " Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 
788 (Utah 1994) (quoting E.A Strout, 665 
P.2d at 1322); see also Cambelt Int% 745 
P.2d at 1242. Having considei'ed the evi-
dence in accordance with this standard, we 
must let the verdict stand. 
At trial, the following colloquy took place 
between Billings' counsel and Billings' father: 
Q: Have you observed Mr. Billings, Stan-
ley Billings, in a state of depression? 
A: Most definitely. 
Q: And can you describe how you were 
able to determine the depression, or how 
you reached this conclusion? 
A: Well, he becomes very, or has been 
since his return, very discouraged as to the 
fact that he hasn't been able £o do what he 
possibly could have done.... 
Q: . . . [D]o you have any understanding 
that the depressions that you have ob-
served associated with Stan are related to 
the fact that he may have recovered more, 
or not? 
A: Yes.. . . [H]e's constantly making 
the statement, quote, "Dad, I want to be a 
better man. I think I could have been a 
better man," words to that effect. 
In addition, two doctors testified that Billings 
was capable of experiencing mental anguish 
and that Billings understood that his recov-
ery from his brain injury was not as full and 
complete as it could have been. One of those 
doctors explained: 
[E]very patient, including Mr. Billings, 
that has sustained an injury and has the 
of a different outcome [absent the error] is suffi-
ciently high as to undermine our confidence in 
the verdict." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 796. 
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ability to look back and see what they were 
like prior to the injury, and compare what 
they are like now, experiences distress. 
And when they can perceive that they have 
not recovered because of a lack of treat-
ment, or inappropriate treatment, it only 
accentuates that distress. 
Although this evidence does not necessarily 
compel the conclusion that Billings suffered 
mental anguish as a result of Union Bankers' 
breach of the implied covenant, it is sufficient 
to sustain the verdict under that theory of 
recovery. Accordingly, we affirm the ver-
dict. 
[15,16] Finally, we address Billings' 
cross-appeal from the district court's award 
of attorney fees. Attorney fees may be re-
coverable as consequential damages flowing 
from an insurer's breach of either the ex-
press or the implied terms of an insurance 
contract. See Canyon Country Store v. Bra-
cey, 781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1989).4 Howev-
er, as consequential damages, attorney fees 
are recoverable only if they were "reasonably 
within the contemplation of, or reasonably 
foreseeable by, the parties at the time the 
contract was made." Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. 
In the instant case, the district court found 
that although it was foreseeable at the time 
the parties entered into the insurance con-
tract that Billings would incur attorney fees 
if Union Bankers breached, the amount of 
fees Billings incurred under his contingency 
fee arrangement was not foreseeable. Ac-
cordingly, the district court awarded Billings 
what it determined to be a reasonable attor-
ney fee of $110,651 but refused to award the 
substantially higher contingency fee which 
Billings actually incurred.5 
[17] Billings now argues that the district 
court's finding that Billings' contingency fee 
arrangement was not foreseeable was not 
supported by the evidence. We reverse a 
trial court's findings of fact only if they are 
4. We express no opinion as to whether attorney 
fees are recoverable as consequential damages in 
other contexts. However, we note that our prior 
cases have allowed such recovery for breach of 
an implied-in-fact employment contract. Heslop 
v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840-41 (Utah 
1992), and for breach of a construction contract 
where the plaintiff incurred attorney fees in de-
fending against hens which arose out of the 
" 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' 
thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" In 
re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 
1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1987)). In this case, Union Bank-
ers presented no evidence that would support 
the district court's finding, while Billings pre-
sented substantial evidence to the contrary. 
For example, Billings established by uncon-
tradicted testimony that in actions against 
insurance companies to recover the benefits 
of an insurance policy, the usual and custom-
ary attorney fee arrangement in Utah is a 
contingency fee of one-third of any recovery 
for claims pursued through trial and a higher 
percentage of any recovery if the case is 
appealed. In addition, Billings presented 
testimony that "all insurance carriers would 
reasonably anticipate and foresee that if their 
insured has to hire an attorney to pursue a 
claim, the insured may pay at least $ or more 
of the recovery in attorneys fees and would 
also have to reimburse all advanced costs and 
expenses." Because there was no evidence 
to the contrary before the district court, we 
conclude that Billings' contingency fee ar-
rangement was foreseeable and therefore 
that the district court's finding that the fee 
amount under Billings' contingency fee ar-
rangement was not foreseeable was clearly 
erroneous. We therefore vacate the district 
court's award of attorney fees and remand 
for recalculation of the fees in accordance 
with Billings' contingency fee arrangement. 
In sum, we conclude that Beck established 
a fairly debatable defense to a claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, but we reject Union Bank-
ers' argument that Billings' claim was fairly 
debatable as a matter of law. Therefore, we 
affirm the jury's finding that Union Bankers 
is liable for breaching the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. We also con-
clude that the district court erred in instruct-
ing the jury that it could award broad conse-
contractor's failure to pay its subcontractors. 
Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & 
Indent. Co., 325 P.2d 906, 908 (Utah 1958). 
5. Billings agreed to pay his attorney one-third of 
any recovery for claims pursued through trial 
and forty percent of any recovery if the case was 
appealed. 
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quential damages for breach of the express 
terms of the insurance contract. We none-
theless affirm the verdict because the jury 
was properly instructed that it could award 
such damages for breach of the implied cove-
nant and the evidence is sufficient to sustain 
the verdict under that alternative theory of 
recovery. Finally, we vacate the district 
court's award of attorney fees and remand 
for recalculation of the fees in accordance 
with Billings' contingency fee arrangement. 
STEWAET, A.C.J., and DURHAM, J., 
concur in ZIMMERMAN, C.J., opinion. 
HOWE, Justice, concurring and 
dissenting: 
I concur except that I would allow the 
recovery of attorney fees by plaintiff as con-
sequential damages only for defendant's 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. I would not allow fees 
based on any breach of the express terms of 
the contract. 
The general rule observed in this jurisdic-
tion is that attorney fees can be awarded to 
the prevailing party in litigation only where 
the award is predicated upon a statute or the 
express terms of a written instrument such 
as a promissory note or a contract. Howev-
er, we have departed from that general rule 
in a few cases and upheld the recovery of 
fees by a successful insured in a first-party 
suit against his or her insurer. The fees 
have been awarded as an element of conse-
quential damages for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing inher-
ent in every insurance policy. Zions First 
Natl Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 
749 P.2d 651, 657 (Utah 1988); Beck v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801-02 
(Utah 1985); see also Moore v. Energy Mut. 
Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah CtApp. 
1991). Attorney fees were also awarded to 
an insured suing his insurer in Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 420 
(Utah 1989), although it is not clear whether 
the fees in that case were awarded for 
breach of the implied covenant or for breach 
of the express terms of the insurance con-
tract. 
HARDMAN Utah 469 
469 (Utah 1996) 
The majority in the instant case recog-
nizes: 
It would not further Beck's purpose of 
encouraging insurers to act reasonably if 
we were to impose the broad consequential 
damages allowed in Beck on every insurer 
who is ultimately determined by a court to 
have incorrectly denied coverage, regard-
less of how reasonable the denial. Such an 
insurer ought to incur no greater damage 
exposure than any other person breaching 
the express terms of a contract. 
Yet despite this statement, the majority 
sanctions the award of attorney fees as an 
element of consequential damages for both 
the breach of the implied covenant and the 
express provisions of the insurance contract. 
With that determination I cannot agree. It 
does violence to our general rule that in a 
breach of contract action, attorney fees can-
not be awarded to the successful party unless 
the parties have so provided in their agree-
ment. I would award fees only for breach of 
the implied covenant, consistent with the ma-
jority's holding that "the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury that it could award broad 
consequential damages for breach of either 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing or the express terms of the insurance 
contract." 
EUSSON, J., concurs in Justice HOWE's 
concurring and dissenting opinion. 
[ O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
Julia Lee ASKEW, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Paul HARDMAN, Defendant 
and Petitioner. 
No. 940613. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 7, 1996. 
Motor vehicle passenger who was in-
jured as result of collision with horse brought 
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sufficient to prove a breach under appropri-
Wayne BECK, Plaintiff and Appellant, ate circumstances. 
v. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 18926. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 12, 1985. 
Insured brought action against insurer 
for alleged bad-faith refusal to settle a 
claim for insured motorist benefits. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Philip P. Fishier, J., entered summary judg-
ment for insurer, and insured appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held 
that: (1) in a first-party relationship be-
tween an insurer and its insured, the duties 
and obligations of the parties are contrac-
tual rather than fiduciary in nature and, 
without more, a breach of those implied or 
express duties can give rise only to a cause 
of action in contract, not one in tort, and (2) 
question whether insurer breached its duty 
of good faith in rejecting insured's claim 
for uninsured motorist benefits without ex-
planation and in failing to further investi-
gate matter, such that insured was dam-
aged when it was forced to accept settle-
ment offered by insurer because of finan-
cial pressure caused by delay in resolving 
matter, was question of fact precluding 
summary judgment on contractual theory 
of failure to fulfill implied contractual duty 
to deal in good faith. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Insurance <§=>602.1 
The good-faith duty to bargain or set-
tle under an insurance contract is only one 
aspect of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing implied in all contracts and is a 
duty which upon violation may give rise to 
a claim for breach of contract. 
2. Insurance <3=>602.2(1) 
Refusal to bargain or settle under an 
insurance contract may, standing alone, be 
3. Insurance <s=>602.1 
Practical end of providing a strong in-
centive for insurers to fulfill their contrac-
tual obligations to their insureds can be 
accomplished as well through a contract 
cause of action upon a failure to bargain in 
good faith without analytical straining ne-
cessitated by the tort approach and with 
far less potential for unforeseen conse-
quences to the law of contracts. 
4. Insurance <s=>602.1 
A tort cause of action does not arise in 
a first-party insurance contract situation by 
reason of a failure to bargain in good faith 
because the relationship between the insur-
er and its insured is fundamentally differ-
ent than in a third-party context. 
5. Insurance <§=*602.1 
In a first-party relationship between an 
insurer and its insured, the duties and obli-
gations of the parties are contractual rath-
er than fiduciary in nature and, without 
more, a breach of those implied or express 
duties can give rise only to a cause of 
action in contract, not one in tort. 
6. Insurance <3=»156(1) 
As parties to a contract, the insured 
and the insurer have parallel obligations to 
perform the contract in good faith, obli-
gations that inhere in every contractual 
relationship. 
7. Insurance <£=>563 
The implied contractual obligation of 
good-faith performance contemplates, at 
the very least, that the insurer will diligent-
ly investigate these acts to enable it to 
determine whether a claim filed by its in-
sured is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, 
and will thereafter act promptly and rea-
sonably in rejecting or settling the claim, 
and also requires the insurer to deal with 
laymen as laymen and not as experts in the 
subtleties of law and underwriting and to 
refrain from actions that will injure the 
insured's ability to obtain the benefits of 
the contract. 
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8. Insurance ®=>602.2(1) 
Performance of the implied contractual 
obligation of good faith is the essence of 
what the insurer has bargained and paid 
for and, if breached, will render insurer 
liable for damages suffered in consequence 
thereof. 
9. Insurance <3=>602.10(1) 
Damages recoverable against an insur-
er for breach of its implied contractual 
obligation of good faith toward insured in-
clude both general damages, those flowing 
naturally from breach, and consequential 
damages, those reasonably within contem-
plation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, 
parties at time contract was made. 
10. Insurance <3=>602.10(1) 
In an action against an insurer for 
breach of a duty to bargain in good faith, 
given that insured frequently faces cata-
strophic consequences if funds are not 
available within a reasonable period of time 
to cover an insured loss, damages for a loss 
well in excess of policy limits, such as for a 
home or a business, may be foreseeable 
and provable. 
11. Damages <&=>56.10 
In unusual cases concerned with an 
insurer's breach of a duty to bargain in 
good faith, damages for mental anguish to 
insured might be provable, but foreseeabil-
ity of any such damages will always hinge 
upon nature and language of contract and 
reasonable expectations of parties. 
12. Judgment <s=>181(23) 
Question whether insurer breached its 
duty of good faith in rejecting insured's 
claim for uninsured motorist benefits with-
out explanation and in failing to further 
investigate matter, such that insured was 
damaged when it was forced to accept set-
tlement offered by insurer because of fi-
nancial pressure caused by delay in resolv-
ing matter, was question of fact precluding 
summary judgment on contractual theory 
of failure to fulfill implied contractual duty 
to deal in good faith. 
Robert J. Debry, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Don J. Hanson, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Plaintiff Wayne Beck appeals from a 
summary judgment dismissing his claim 
against Farmers Insurance Exchange, his 
automobile insurance carrier, alleging that 
Farmers had refused in bad faith to settle 
a claim for uninsured motorist benefits. 
We hold that on the record before us, Beck 
stated a claim for relief and a summary 
judgment was inappropriate. We reverse 
and remand for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
Beck injured his knee in a hit-and-run 
accident on January 16, 1982, when his car 
was struck by a car owned by Ann Kirk-
land. Ms. Kirkland asserted that her car 
had been stolen and denied any knowledge 
of or responsibility for the accident. Beck 
filed a claim with Kirkland's insurer, but 
liability was denied on April 20, 1982. 
At the time of the accident, Beck carried 
automobile insurance with Farmers. Un-
der that policy, Beck was provided with 
both no-fault and uninsured motorist insur-
ance benefits. On February 23,1982, while 
his claim against Kirkland was pending, 
Beck filed a claim with Farmers for no-
fault benefits. Sometime prior to May 26, 
1982, Farmers paid Beck $5,000 for medical 
expenses (the no-fault policy limit) and 
$1,299.43 for lost wages. 
On June 23, 1982, Beck's counsel filed a 
claim with Farmers for uninsured motorist 
benefits, demanding the policy limit, $20,-
000, for general damages suffered as a 
result of the accident. His counsel alleges 
that the brochure documenting Beck's dam-
ages, submitted to Farmers with the June 
23rd settlement offer, established that his 
claim was worth substantially more than 
$20,000. Farmers' adjuster rejected the 
settlement offer without explanation on 
July 1, 1982. 
Beck filed this lawsuit one month later, 
on August 2, 1982, alleging three causes of 
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action: first, that by refusing to pay his 
uninsured motorist claim, Farmers had 
breached its contract of insurance with 
him; second, that by acting in bad faith in 
refusing to investigate the claim, bargain 
with Beck, or settle the claim, Farmers had 
breached an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing; and third, that Farmers 
had acted oppressively and maliciously to-
ward Beck with the intention of, or in reck-
less disregard of the likelihood of, causing 
emotional distress. Under the first claim, 
Beck sought damages for breach of con-
tract in the amount of the policy limits; 
under the second, he asked for compensato-
ry damages in excess of the policy limits 
for additional injuries, including mental an-
guish; and under the third, he sought puni-
tive damages of $500,000. 
Sometime in August of 1982, Beck's 
counsel contacted Farmers' counsel and of-
fered to settle the whole matter for $20,-
000. This offer was rejected. Farmers 
filed an answer on September 1, 1982, and 
at the same time, moved to strike the pray-
er for punitive damages on the ground that 
they were unavailable for a breach of con-
tract. Farmers' motion was granted. On 
September 29th, the trial court bifurcated 
the case and agreed to try the claim for 
failure to pay uninsured motorist benefits 
independent of Beck's claim alleging 
breach of an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
Immediately after the trial judge bifur-
cated the case, Beck's counsel expressly 
revoked the previously rejected offer to 
settle the whole matter for $20,000. In-
stead, Beck offered to settle only the fail-
ure to pay the uninsured motorist benefits 
claim for $20,000, reserving the implied 
covenant or "bad faith" claim for separate 
resolution. 
On October 20, 1982, Farmers apparently 
counteroffered. Negotiations proceeded, 
and sometime in late November, the parties 
agreed to settle the uninsured motorist 
claim for $15,000. On December 6, 1982, 
the parties stipulated to dismissal of that 
claim and specifically reserved the bad 
faith claim for later disposition. 
In mid-December, Farmers moved to dis-
miss the reserved bad faith claim on two 
theories. First, Farmers asserted that un-
der Lyon v. Hartford Accident and In-
demnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 
(1971), it "had no duty to bargain with or 
settle plaintiffs uninsured motorist claim 
and, therefore, [could not] be held liable" 
for breach of contract or bad faith. Sec-
ond, Farmers argued that even if it had 
some duty to bargain or to settle the claim, 
the facts set forth in the pleadings on file 
did not establish that it had breached the 
duty. No memoranda or factual affidavits 
supported this motion. 
Farmers' motion was opposed by affida-
vits of Beck, his counsel, and a former 
insurance adjuster who worked for Beck's 
counsel as a paralegal. In his affidavit, 
Beck's counsel recited the dates and terms 
of the various settlement offers and the 
fact that they had been rejected without 
counteroffer. Beck's affidavit stated that 
he had accepted the $15,000 offer only be-
cause of financial pressures caused by the 
substantial expenses he had incurred in the 
ten months since the accident. The parale-
gal's affidavit stated that he had been an 
insurance adjuster for 19 years and that he 
had reviewed the settlement documentation 
submitted to Farmers in June when the 
claim was first filed. He expressed the 
opinion that a reasonable and prudent in-
surance company would have valued the 
claim at between $30,000 and $40,000 and 
attempted to settle the matter within 
weeks after the initial offer. The paralegal 
charged that the "only reason for such a 
substantial delay in settling this claim 
would be to put Mr. Beck in a situation of 
financial need and stress so that he would 
accept the first settlement offer," a tactic 
he characterized as acting in bad faith. 
Farmers filed no rebuttal affidavits, and 
the trial court granted Farmers' motion 
without specifying the basis for its holding. 
Beck asks this Court to overrule Lyon 
and permit an insured to sue for an insur-
er's bad faith refusal to bargain or settle. 
He points out that many states now allow a 
tort action for breach of an insurer's duty 
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to deal fairly and in good faith with its 
insured. Assuming that we abandon Lyon, 
Beck argues that the affidavits submitted 
in opposition to Farmers' motion for sum-
mary judgment were sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to wheth-
er Farmers breached an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. 
Farmers does not now contend, as it did 
below, that it had no duty to bargain or 
settle. Instead, it argues that under Lyon, 
an insurer cannot be held liable for bad 
faith simply because it refused to bargain 
or to settle a claim; rather, it argues, to 
sustain such a claim a plaintiff must pro-
duce evidence of bad faith wholly apart 
from the "mere failure" to bargain or set-
tle. 
Our ruling in Lyon left an insured with-
out any effective remedy against an insur-
er that refuses to bargain or settle in good 
faith with the insured. An insured who 
has suffered a loss and is pressed financial-
ly is at a marked disadvantage when bar-
gaining with an insurer over payment for 
that loss. Failure to accept a proffered 
settlement, although less than fair, can 
lead to catastrophic consequences for an 
insured who, as a direct consequence of the 
loss, may be peculiarly vulnerable, both 
economically and emotionally. The tempta-
tion for an insurer to delay settlement 
while pressures build on the insured is 
great, especially if the insurer's exposure 
cannot exceed the policy limits. See Law-
ton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance 
Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576, 579 (1978); 
Harvey & Wiseman, First Party Bad 
Faith: Common Law Remedies and a 
Proposed Legislative Solution, 72 Ky.LJ. 
141, 146, 167-69 (1983-84) (hereinafter cit-
ed as "First Party Bad Faith"); Note, The 
Availability of Excess Damages for 
Wrongful Refusal to Honor First Party 
1. The Court in Lyon considered only the ques-
tion of whether a claim of bad faith gave rise to 
a tort cause of action; however, to the extent 
that Lyon is philosophically inconsistent with 
our recognition today of a cause of action in 
contract, it is overruled. 
2. We use the term "first-party" to refer to an 
insurance agreement where the insurer agrees 
Insurance Claims—An Emerging Trend, 
45 Fordham L.Rev. 164, 164-67 (Oct. 1976) 
(hereinafter cited as "Availability of Excess 
Damages"). 
[1,2] In light of these considerations, 
we now conclude that an insured should be 
provided with a remedy. However, we do 
not agree with plaintiff that a tort action is 
appropriate. Instead, we hold that the 
good faith duty to bargain or settle under 
an insurance contract is only one aspect of 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
implied in all contracts and that a violation 
of that duty gives rise to a claim for breach 
of contract.1 In addition, we do not adopt 
the limitation suggested by Fanners, but 
hold that the refusal to bargain or settle, 
standing alone, may, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, be sufficient to prove a 
breach. 
We recognize that a majority of states 
permit an insured to institute a tort action 
against an insurer who fails to bargain in 
good faith in a "first-party" situation,2 
adopting the approach first announced by 
the California Supreme Court in Gruen-
berg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 
510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480 (1973). 
See, e.g., Bibeault v. Hanover Insurance 
Co., R.I., 417 A.2d 313 (1980); Craft v. 
Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 
565 (7th Cir.1978) (applying Indiana law); 
MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Flint, 
Tenn., 574 S.W.2d 718 (1978). Apparently, 
these courts have taken this step as a mat-
ter of policy in order to provide what they 
perceive to be an adequate remedy for an 
insured wronged by an insurer's recalci-
trance. These courts have reasoned that 
under contract law principles, an insurer 
who improperly refuses to settle a first-
party claim may be liable only for damages 
measured by the maximum dollar amount 
to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for 
losses suffered by the insured. The present case 
involves such a first-party situation. In con-
trast, a "third-party" situation is one where the 
insurer contracts to defend the insured against 
claims made by third parties against the insured 
and to pay any resulting liability, up to the 
specified dollar limit. 
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such a damage measure provides little or 
no incentive to an insurer to promptly and 
faithfully fulfill its contractual obligations. 
Accordingly, these courts have adopted a 
tort approach in order to allow an insured 
to recover extensive consequential and pu-
nitive damages, which they consider to be 
unavailable in an action based solely on a 
breach of contract. See Availability of 
Excess Damages, supra, at 168-77; First 
Party Bad Faith, supra, at 158. 
[3] We conclude that the tort approach 
adopted by these courts is without a sound 
theoretical foundation and has the potential 
for distorting well-established principles of 
contract law. Moreover, the practical end 
of providing a strong incentive for insurers 
to fulfill their contractual obligations can 
be accomplished as well through a contract 
cause of action, without the analytical 
straining necessitated by the tort approach 
and with far less potential for unforeseen 
consequences to the law of contracts. 
The analytical weaknesses of the tort 
approach are easily seen. In Gruenberg, 
the California court held that an insurer 
has a duty to deal in good faith with its 
insured and that an insured can bring an 
action in tort, rather than contract, for 
breach of that duty because the duty is 
imposed by law and, being nonconsensual, 
does not arise out of the contract. Gloss-
ing over any distinctions between first- and 
third-party situations, the court concluded 
that the duty imposed upon the insurer 
when bargaining with its insured in a first-
party situation is merely another aspect of 
the fiduciary duty owed in the third-party 
context. Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance 
Co., 9 Cal.3d at 573-74, 510 P.2d at 1037, 
108 Cal.Rptr. at 485. 
Although this Court, in Ammerman v. 
Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 19 Utah 2d 
261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967), recognized a tort 
cause of action for breach of an insurer's 
obligation to bargain in a third-party con-
text, we cannot agree with the Gruenberg 
court that the considerations which compel 
the recognition of a tort cause of action in 
a third-party context are present in the 
In Ammerman, we 
stated that because a third-party insurance 
contract obligates the insurer to defend the 
insured, the insurer incurs a fiduciary duty 
to its insured to protect the insured's inter-
ests as zealously as it would its own; con-
sequently, a tort cause of action is recog-
nized to remedy a violation of that duty. 
19 Utah 2d at 265-66, 430 P.2d at 578-79. 
[4] However, in Lyon v. Hartford Acci-
dent and Indemnity Co., we held that a 
tort cause of action did not arise in a first-
party insurance contract situation because 
the relationship between the insurer and its' 
insured is fundamentally different than in 
a third-party context: 
In the [third-party] situation, the insurer 
must act in good faith and be as zealous 
in protecting the interests of the insured 
as it would be in regard to its own. In 
the [first-party] situation, the insured 
and the insurer are, in effect and prac-
tically speaking, adversaries. 
25 Utah 2d at 319, 480 P.2d at 745 (cita-
tions omitted). See also Lawton v. Great 
Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 392 A.2d at 
580-81. 
This distinction is of no small conse-
quence. In a third-party situation, the in-
surer controls the disposition of claims 
against its insured, who relinquishes any 
right to negotiate on his own behalf. 
Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 
572 F.2d at 569. An insurer's failure to act 
in good faith exposes its insured to a judg-
ment and personal liability in excess of the 
policy limits. Santilli v. State Farm Life 
Insurance Co., 278 Or. 53, 61-62, 562 P.2d 
965, 969 (1977). In essence, the contract 
itself creates a fiduciary relationship be-
cause of the trust and reliance placed in the 
insurer by its insured. Cf Hal Taylor 
Associates v. UnionAmerica, Inc., Utah, 
657 P.2d 743, 748-49 (1982). The insured is 
wholly dependent upon the insurer to see 
that, in dealing with claims by third par-
ties, the insured's best interests are pro-
tected. In addition, when dealing with 
third parties, the insurer acts as an agent 
for the insured with respect to the disputed 
claim. Wholly apart from the contractual 
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obligations undertaken by the parties, the 
law imposes upon all agents a fiduciary 
obligation to their principals with respect to 
matters falling within the scope of their 
agency. Id. at 748; see generally 3 Am. 
Jur.2d Agency § 199 (1962). 
In the first-party situation, on the other 
hand, the reasons for finding a fiduciary 
relationship and imposing a corresponding 
duty are absent. No relationship of trust 
and reliance is created by the contract; it 
simply obligates the insurer to pay claims 
submitted by the insured in accordance 
with the contract. Santilli v. State Farm 
Life Insurance Co., 278 Or. at 61-62, 562 
P.2d at 969. Furthermore, none of the 
indicia of agency are present. See general-
ly Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual In-
surance Co., Mo.App., 665 S.W.2d 13, 18-
20 (1984). 
Clearly, then, it is difficult to find a 
theoretically sound basis for analogizing 
the duty owed in a third-party context to 
that owed in a first-party context. And 
wholly apart from any theoretical prob-
lems, tailoring the tort analysis to first-par-
ty insurance contract cases has proven dif-
ficult. The pragmatic reason for adopting 
the tort approach is that it exposes insurers 
to consequential and punitive damages 
awards in excess of the policy limits. How-
ever, the courts appear to have had difficul-
ty in developing a sound rationale for limit-
ing the tort approach to insurance contract 
cases. This may be because there is no 
sound theoretical difference between a 
first-party insurance contract and any oth-
er contract, at least no difference that justi-
fies permitting punitive damages for the 
breach of one and not the other. In any 
event, the tort approach and the accompa-
3. We recognize that in some cases the acts con-
stituting a breach of contract may also result in 
breaches of duty that are independent of the 
contract and may give rise to causes of action in 
tort. Hal Taylor Assoc, v. UnionAmerica, 657 
P.2d at 750; Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. 
Co., 392 A.2d at 580. For example, the law of 
this state recognizes a duty to refrain from in-
tentionally causing severe emotional distress to 
others. Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 
P,2d 344 (1961). Thus, intentional and out-
rageous conduct by an insurer against an in-
sured, coupled with a failure to bargain, could 
nying punitive damages have moved rather 
quickly into areas far afield from insur-
ance. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying 
Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 
Cal.3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166-67, 206 
Cal.Rptr. 354, 362-63 (1984); Wallis v. Su-
perior Court, 160 Cal.App.3d 1109, 207 
Cal.Rptr. 123, 127-29 (1984); Gates v. Life 
of Montana Insurance Co., Mont., 668 
P.2d 213, 214-16 (1983). 
Furthermore, the courts adopting the 
tort approach have had some difficulty in 
determining what degree of bad faith is 
necessary to sustain a claim. E.g., Ander-
son v. Continental Insurance Co., 85 
Wis.2d 675, 692-94, 271 N.W.2d 368, 376-
77 (1978). From a practical standpoint, the 
state of mind of the insurer is irrelevant; 
even an inadvertent breach of the covenant 
of good faith implied in an insurance con-
tract can substantially harm the insured 
and warrants a remedy. 
[5,6] We therefore hold that in a first-
party relationship between an insurer and 
its insured, the duties and obligations of 
the parties are contractual rather than fi-
duciary. Without more, a breach of those 
implied or express duties can give rise only 
to a cause of action in contract, not one in 
tort.3 This position has not been widely 
adopted by other courts, although a "re-
spectable body of authority'' is developing. 
See Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual 
Insurance Co., 665 S.W.2d at 18-19, and 
cases cited therein; Lawton v. Great 
Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 118 N.H. 
607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978); Kewin v. Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 409 
Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980); Avail-
conceivably result in tort liability independent 
of (and concurrent with) liability for breach of 
contract. Additionally, the facts that give rise to 
a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith 
could also amount to fraudulent activity, ren-
dering an insurer independently liable for dam-
ages flowing from the fraud. See Wetherbee v. 
United Ins. Co., 265 Cal.App.2d 921, 71 Cal.Rptr. 
764 (1968). Also, under various unfair practices 
acts, there may be statutory requirements that 
give rise to independent causes of action. E.g., 
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 31-27-1 to -24. 
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ability of Excess Damages, supra p. 4, at 
168-71. We further hold that as parties to 
a contract, the insured and the insurer have 
parallel obligations to perform the contract 
in good faith, obligations that inhere in 
every contractual relationship. State 
Automobile & Casualty Underwriters v. 
Salisbury, 27 Utah 2d 229, 232, 494 P.2d 
529, 531 (1972); Leigh Furniture & Car-
pet Co. v. Isom, Utah, 657 P.2d 293, 306 
(1982).4 
[7,8] Few cases define the implied con-
tractual obligation to perform a first-party 
insurance contract in good faith. How-
ever, because the considerations are sim-
ilar, we freely look to the tort cases that 
have described the incidents of the duty of 
good faith in the context of first-party in-
surance contracts. From those cases and 
from our own analysis of the obligations 
undertaken by the parties, we conclude 
that the implied obligation of good faith 
performance contemplates, at the very 
least, that the insurer will diligently inves-
tigate the facts to enable it to determine 
whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate 
the claim, and will thereafter act promptly 
and reasonably in rejecting or settling the 
claim. See Anderson v. Continental In-
surance Co., 85 Wis.2d at 692-93, 271 
N.W.2d at 377; Egan v. Mutual of Omaha 
Insurance Co., 24 Cal.3d 809, 818-19, 620 
P.2d 141, 145-46, 169 Cal.Rptr. 691, 695-96 
(1979). The duty of good faith also re-
quires the insurer to "deal with laymen as 
laymen and not as experts in the subtleties 
of law and underwriting" and to refrain 
from actions that will injure the insured's 
ability to obtain the benefits of the con-
tract. MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Flint, 574 S.W.2d at 720, quoting Mer-
chants Indemnity Corp. v. Eggleston, 37 
N.J. 114, 122, 179 A.2d 505, 509 (1962); 
accord Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 
53 N.J. 313, 327, 250 A.2d 580, 587 (1969). 
These performances are the essence of 
what the insured has bargained and paid 
4. The duty to perform the contract in good faith 
cannot, by definition, be waived by either party 
to the agreement. 
for, and the insurer has the obligation to 
perform them. When an insurer has 
breached this duty, it is liable for damages 
suffered in consequence of that breach. 
In adopting the contract approach, we 
are not ignoring the principal reason for 
the adoption of the tort approach—to pro-
vide damage exposure in excess of the poli-
cy limits and thus remove any incentive for 
breaching the duty of good faith. Despite 
what some courts have suggested, e.g., 
Santilli v. State Farm Insurance Co., 562 
P.2d at 969, and what some commentators 
have asserted, e.g., J. Appleman, Insur-
ance Law & Practice § 8878.15 at 424-26 
(1981), there is no reason to limit damages 
recoverable for breach of a duty to investi-
gate, bargain, and settle claims in good 
faith to the amount specified in the insur-
ance policy.5 Nothing inherent in the con-
tract law approach mandates this narrow 
definition of recoverable damages. Al-
though the policy limits define the amount 
for which the insurer may be held respon-
sible in performing the contract, they do 
not define the amount for which it may be 
liable upon a breach. Lawton v. Great 
Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 392 A.2d at 
579. 
[9] Damages recoverable for breach of 
contract include both general damages, ie., 
those flowing naturally from the breach, 
and consequential damages, i.e., those rea-
sonably within the contemplation of, or rea-
sonably foreseeable by, the parties at the 
time the contract was made. Pacific Coast 
Title Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident 
& Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 379, 325 
P.2d 906, 907 (1958), citing Hadley v. Bax-
endale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 
(1854). We have repeatedly recognized 
that consequential damages for breach of 
contract may reach beyond the bare con-
tract terms. See, e.g., Pacific Coast Title 
Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & 
Idemnity, 7 Utah 2d at 379, 325 P.2d at 908 
5. In Ammerman, we suggested in dicta that in 
an action for breach of an insurance policy, the 
damages could not exceed the policy limits. 19 
Utah 2d at 264, 430 P.2d at 578. We expressly 
disavow this dicta. 
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(attorney fees incurred for settling and de-
fending claims were foreseeable result of 
contractor's default); Bevan v. J.H. Con-
struction Co., Utah, 669 P.2d 442, 444 
(1983) (home purchasers entitled to dam-
ages for loss of favorable mortgage inter-
est rate resulting from builder's breach of 
contract). 
[10,11] In an action for breach of a 
duty to bargain in good faith, a broad 
range of recoverable damages is conceiva-
ble, particularly given the unique nature 
and purpose of an insurance contract. An 
insured frequently faces catastrophic con-
sequences if funds are not available within 
a reasonable period of time to cover an 
insured loss; damages for losses well in 
excess of the policy limits, such as for a 
home or a business, may therefore be fore-
seeable and provable. See, e.g., Reichert v. 
General Insurance Co., 59 Cal.Rptr. 724, 
728, 428 P.2d 860, 864 (1967), vacated on 
other grounds, 68 Cal.2d 822, 442 P.2d 377, 
69 CaLRptr. 321 (1968) (because bankrupt-
cy was a foreseeable consequence of fire 
insurer's failure to pay, insurer was liable 
for consequential damages flowing from 
bankruptcy). Furthermore, it is axiomatic 
that insurance frequently is purchased not 
only to provide funds in case of loss, but to 
provide peace of mind for the insured or his 
beneficiaries. Therefore, although other 
courts adopting the contract approach have 
been reluctant to allow such an award, 
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insur-
ance Co., 392 A.2d at 581-82, we find no 
difficulty with the proposition that, in un-
usual cases, damages for mental anguish 
might be provable.6 See Kewin v. Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 409 
Mich, at 440-55, 295 N.W.2d at 64-72 (Wil-
liams, J., dissenting); cf. Lambert v. Sine, 
123 Utah 145, 150, 256 P.2d 241, 244 (1953). 
The foreseeability of any such damages 
will always hinge upon the nature and lan-
guage of the contract and the reasonable 
expectations of the parties. J. Calamari & 
6. Clearly, damages will not be available for the 
mere disappointment, frustration, or anxiety 
normally experienced in the process of filing an 
J. Perillo, Contracts § 14-5 at 523-25 (2d 
ed. 1977). 
With the foregoing principles in mind, we 
return to a consideration of the present 
case. The trial court granted summary 
judgment for the insurer in the face of 
affidavits of the insured, his counsel, and a 
paralegal who had been an adjuster for 
many years. In the absence of any respon-
sive affidavits, we take the assertions of 
the affidavits as true and view all unex-
plained facts in a light most favorable to 
Beck. It appears that the insurer was 
served with Beck's claim on June 23, 1982. 
On July 1st, the claim was rejected without 
explanation and without any request for 
additional facts. The insured heard noth-
ing more from the insurer until after Au-
gust 2d, when this suit was filed. The 
affidavits state that the insured accepted 
the settlement offered by the insurer in 
late October because of the financial pres-
sure caused by the delay in resolving the 
matter. The affidavits also offer the opin-
ion of the expert adjuster turned paralegal 
that the delay was in bad faith. 
From January until late June, Beck was 
apparently negotiating with the car own-
er's carrier and not with Farmers, for no 
claim was filed with Farmers until June 
23rd. Therefore, none of the delay be-
tween January and June 23rd can be attrib-
uted to Farmers. The unexplained delay 
thereafter, however, together with a flat 
rejection of plaintiffs offer, provides a fac-
tual basis for this cause of action sufficient 
to withstand summary judgment. Farmers 
had an obligation to diligently investigate 
and evaluate Beck's claim. It rejected the 
claim in one week, and we must infer that 
the insurer did nothing to investigate or 
evaluate the claim during the following 
month. 
[12] Under these circumstances and re-
solving all doubts in Beck's favor, we can-
not say that a jury could not find that 
Farmers breached its duty of good faith in 
rejecting Beck's claim without explanation 
insurance claim and negotiating a settlement 
with an insurer. 
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and in failing to further investigate the Affirmed. 
matter. Therefore, we remand the matter Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
to the trial court for further proceedings. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
Claron D. BAILEY, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 18961. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 19, 1985. 
Assignee of second deed of trust filed 
action requesting that he be awarded ex-
cess sale proceeds over amount due holder 
of first deed of trust. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkin-
son, J., found for assignee, and holder of 
first deed of trust appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that affidavit of 
attorney representing assignee of second 
deed of trust establishing that bankruptcy 
judge dismissed assignee's complaint seek-
ing to stay trustee's sale because of se-
cured claims on debtor's property and be-
cause bankruptcy court had no interest in 
funds, and that bankruptcy judge had earli-
er favorably responded to statement that 
assignee would prefer to go to state court, 
demonstrated that bankruptcy court did 
not make adjudication on merits, and thus, 
bankruptcy court's dismissal was not res 
judicata so as to bar state court action by 
assignee seeking to recover excess sale 
proceeds over amount due holder of first 
deed of trust. 
1. Appeal and Error <s=>204(4) 
In action brought by assignee of sec-
ond deed of trust seeking to be awarded 
excess sale proceeds over amount due hold-
er of first deed of trust, holder of first 
deed of trust, by failing to interpose any 
objection at trial to use of affidavit of 
plaintiff's attorney, waived objection on ba-
sis of allegation that such affidavit was 
hearsay, and could not raise such issue for 
first time on appeal. 
2. Judgment <s=>654 
Finding that court does not have juris-
diction is not the sort of adjudication that 
can serve as basis for res judicata on mer-
its. 
3. Judgment @=»829(3) 
Affidavit of attorney representing as-
signee of second deed of trust establishing 
that bankruptcy judge dismissed assignee's 
complaint seeking to stay trustee's sale 
because of secured claims on debtor's prop-
erty and because bankruptcy court had no 
interest in funds, and that bankruptcy 
judge had earlier favorably responded to 
statement that assignee would prefer to go 
to state court, demonstrated that bankrupt-
cy court did not make adjudication on mer-
its, and thus, bankruptcy court's dismissal 
was not res judicata so as to bar state 
court action by assignee seeking to recover 
excess sale proceeds over amount due hold-
er of first deed of trust. 
Edward M. Garrett, Joseph E. Hatch, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel-
lant. 
J. Steven Newton, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The plaintiff, a mechanic's lien holder 
and assignee of a second position trust 
deed, filed a complaint with the federal 
bankruptcy court asking the court to stay a 
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